Jane McAdam, UNSW Sydney; Regina Jefferies, UNSW Sydney, and Thomas Mulder, UNSW Sydney

As thousands of Australian citizens and permanent residents stuck in Iran and Israel continue to register for repatriation flights, the government is scrambling to find safe ways to evacuate them.

With the airspace over both countries closed, the government is considering other ways to bring them home.

The current plan is to charter buses from private companies to take people from Israel into neighbouring Jordan. As Prime Minister Anthony Albanese stressed: “We want to make sure people are looked after, but they need to be looked after safely as well”.

This is not the first time Australia has faced challenges in evacuating nationals stranded abroad. When conflict, disasters or other emergencies occur overseas, the government regularly works to bring Australians home.

In the early days of the COVID pandemic, for instance, the government arranged repatriation flights and established quarantine facilities to assist Australians who were stuck outside the country. Australia has repeatedly assisted its citizens caught in conflict zones to get back home, including from Afghanistan in 2021 and Lebanon in 2024.

And when an earthquake devasted Vanuatu last December, Australia moved swiftly to get Australians out.

Is Australia legally required to repatriate people?

While there is a longstanding and widespread practice of governments repatriating their nationals in emergencies, countries generally do not have a legal responsibility to do so.

Instead, governments’ decisions are discretionary and made on a case-by-case basis. They are often influenced by diplomatic, logistical and security considerations.

Governments have a right – but not a duty – to provide consular assistance to their nationals abroad. This includes issuing travel documents, liaising with local authorities and, in exceptional cases, facilitating evacuations.

The Consular Services Charter outlines what Australians abroad can expect from their government. It makes clear that while the government will do what it can, there are limits. Assistance is not guaranteed, especially in areas where Australia has no diplomatic presence or where security conditions make intervention too dangerous.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is the lead agency responsible for coordinating Australians’ evacuation with embassies, airlines and international partners. Decisions to evacuate are ultimately made by the minister for foreign affairs following a recommendation, where possible, by the Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF).

Repatriation efforts are guided by the Australian Government Plan for the Reception of Australian Citizens and Approved Foreign Nationals Evacuated from Overseas (AUSRECEPLAN). This arrangement that sets out a process for “the safe repatriation of Australians, their immediate dependants, permanent residents and approved foreign nationals (evacuees) following an Australian government-led evacuation in response to an overseas disaster or adverse security situation”. It outlines how federal, state and territory agencies coordinate to receive and support evacuees once they arrive in Australia, ensuring that returns are not only swift, but also safe and orderly.

Challenges and constraints

Repatriation during a crisis is a complex undertaking. Quite aside from the emergency conditions, which may close off usual travel options or routes, the Australian government cannot force another country to allow an evacuation. It also cannot guarantee safe passage, especially in conflicts.

Identifying and communicating with citizens overseas can also be tricky, often requiring people to have self-registered with consular authorities to receive updates. In addition, consular services may be strained when embassies and consular offices have closed, as is the case in Israel and Iran.

For these reasons, countries sometimes band together to assist each other. For instance, Australia and Canada have agreed that where one has a consular presence but the other does not, they will help to repatriate the other’s citizens.

Similarly, the United States helped evacuate Australians and other allies’ nationals from Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover in 2021. Countries in the European Union can activate a special regional mechanism to facilitate the repatriation of their citizens caught up in emergencies abroad.

In exceptional circumstances, countries have sometimes extracted their stranded nationals through military operations, known as “non-combatant evacuation operations” (NEOs). This involves the military temporarily occupying a location on foreign soil to evacuate people. Some recent examples include the large-scale evacuations of foreign nationals from Afghanistan in 2021, Sudan during the civil war that began in 2023 and Lebanon during the 2024 Israeli–Hezbollah conflict.

NEOs generally require the consent of the country from where the evacuation takes place, but their precise legal basis remains ambiguous under international law.

In all cases, the evacuation of nationals is operationally complex – as exemplified by the current situation in Iran and Israel. Countries with limited resources may struggle to repatriate their nationals at all. This can mean some foreign nationals are “rescued”, while others are left behind.

And, of course, local populations generally aren’t eligible for evacuation at all. This can leave people in extremely dangerous circumstances.

That is why we have proposed the creation of an Australian framework for humanitarian emergencies that, among other things, would facilitate the safe and swift departure of certain non-citizens at particular risk. This would underscore that Australia’s approach to evacuations is, at its heart, about protecting people during crises.

Jane McAdam, Scientia Professor and ARC Laureate Fellow, Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, UNSW Sydney; Regina Jefferies, Laureate Postdoctoral Fellow, ARC Laureate Evacuations Research Hub, UNSW Sydney, and Thomas Mulder, Laureate Postdoctoral Fellow, ARC Laureate Evacuations Research Hub, UNSW Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Amin Saikal, Victoria University

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has gone beyond his initial aim of destroying Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons. He has called on the Iranian people to rise up against their dictatorial Islamic regime and ostensibly transform Iran along the lines of Israeli interests.

United States President Donald Trump is now weighing possible military action in support of Netanyahu’s goal and asked for Iran’s total surrender.

If the US does get involved, it wouldn’t be the first time it’s tried to instigate regime change by military means in the Middle East. The US invaded Iraq in 2003 and backed a NATO operation in Libya in 2011, toppling the regimes of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, respectively.

In both cases, the interventions backfired, causing long-term instability in both countries and in the broader region.

Could the same thing happen in Iran if the regime is overthrown?

As I describe in my book, Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic, Iran is a pluralist society with a complex history of rival groups trying to assert their authority. A democratic transition would be difficult to achieve.

The overthrow of the shah

The Iranian Islamic regime assumed power in the wake of the pro-democracy popular uprising of 1978–79, which toppled Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s pro-Western monarchy.

Until this moment, Iran had a long history of monarchical rule dating back 2,500 years. Mohammad Reza, the last shah, was the head of the Pahlavi dynasty, which came to power in 1925.

In 1953, the shah was forced into exile under the radical nationalist and reformist impulse of the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. He was shortly returned to his throne through a CIA-orchestrated coup.

Despite all his nationalist, pro-Western, modernising efforts, the shah could not shake off the indignity of having been re-throned with the help of a foreign power.

The revolution against him 25 years later was spearheaded by pro-democracy elements. But it was made up of many groups, including liberalists, communists and Islamists, with no uniting leader.

The Shia clerical group (ruhaniyat), led by the Shah’s religious and political opponent, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, proved to be best organised and capable of providing leadership to the revolution. Khomeini had been in exile from the early 1960s (at first in Iraq and later in France), yet he and his followers held considerable sway over the population, especially in traditional rural areas.

When US President Jimmy Carter’s administration found it could no longer support the shah, he left the country and went into exile in January 1979. This enabled Khomeini to return to Iran to a tumultuous welcome.

Birth of the Islamic Republic

In the wake of the uprising, Khomeini and his supporters, including the current supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, abolished the monarchy and transformed Iran to a cleric-dominated Islamic Republic, with anti-US and anti-Israel postures. He ruled the country according to his unique vision of Islam.

Khomeini denounced the US as a “Great Satan” and Israel as an illegal usurper of the Palestinian lands – Jerusalem, in particular. He also declared a foreign policy of “neither east, nor west” but pro-Islamic, and called for the spread of the Iranian revolution in the region.

Khomeini not only changed Iran, but also challenged the US as the dominant force in shaping the regional order. And the US lost one of the most important pillars of its influence in the oil-rich and strategically important Persian Gulf region.

Fear of hostile American or Israeli (or combined) actions against the Islamic Republic became the focus of Iran’s domestic and foreign policy behaviour.

A new supreme leader takes power

Khomeini died in 1989. His successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has ruled Iran largely in the same jihadi (combative) and ijtihadi (pragmatic) ways, steering the country through many domestic and foreign policy challenges.

Khamenei fortified the regime with an emphasis on self-sufficiency, a stronger defence capability and a tilt towards the east – Russia and China – to counter the US and its allies. He has stood firm in opposition to the US and its allies – Israel, in particular. And he has shown flexibility when necessary to ensure the survival and continuity of the regime.

Khamenei wields enormous constitutional power and spiritual authority.

He has presided over the building of many rule-enforcing instruments of state power, including the expansion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its paramilitary wing, the Basij, revolutionary committees, and Shia religious networks.

The Shia concept of martyrdom and loyalty to Iran as a continuous sovereign country for centuries goes to the heart of his actions, as well as his followers.

Khamenei and his rule enforcers, along with an elected president and National Assembly, are fully cognisant that if the regime goes down, they will face the same fate. As such, they cannot be expected to hoist the white flag and surrender to Israel and the US easily.

However, in the event of the regime falling under the weight of a combined internal uprising and external pressure, it raises the question: what is the alternative?

The return of the shah?

Many Iranians are discontented with the regime, but there is no organised opposition under a nationally unifying leader.

The son of the former shah, the crown prince Reza Pahlavi, has been gaining some popularity. He has been speaking out on X in the last few days, telling his fellow Iranians:

The end of the Islamic Republic is the end of its 46-year war against the Iranian nation. The regime’s apparatus of repression is falling apart. All it takes now is a nationwide uprising to put an end to this nightmare once and for all.

Since the deposition of his father, he has lived in exile in the US. As such, he has been tainted by his close association with Washington and Jerusalem, especially Netanyahu.

If he were to return to power – likely through the assistance of the US – he would face the same problem of political legitimacy as his father did.

What does the future hold?

Iran has never had a long tradition of democracy. It experienced brief instances of liberalism in the first half of the 20th century, but every attempt at making it durable resulted in disarray and a return to authoritarian rule.

Also, the country has rarely been free of outside interventionism, given its vast hydrocarbon riches and strategic location. It’s also been prone to internal fragmentation, given its ethnic and religious mix.

The Shia Persians make up more than half of the population, but the country has a number of Sunni ethnic minorities, such as Kurds, Azaris, Balochis and Arabs. They have all had separatist tendencies.

Iran has historically been held together by centralisation rather than diffusion of power.

Should the Islamic regime disintegrate in one form or another, it would be an mistake to expect a smooth transfer of power or transition to democratisation within a unified national framework.

At the same time, the Iranian people are highly cultured and creative, with a very rich and proud history of achievements and civilisation.

They are perfectly capable of charting their own destiny as long as there aren’t self-seeking foreign hands in the process – something they have rarely experienced.

Amin Saikal, Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies, Australian National University; and Vice Chancellor’s Strategic Fellow, Victoria University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Andrew Thomas, Deakin University

The timing and targets of Israel’s attacks on Iran tell us that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s short-term goal is to damage Iran’s nuclear facilities in order to severely diminish its weapons program.

But Netanyahu has made clear another goal: he said the war with Iran “could certainly” lead to regime change in the Islamic republic.

These comments came after an Israeli plan to assassinate the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was reportedly rebuffed by United States President Donald Trump.

It’s no secret Israel has wanted to see the current government of Iran fall for some time, as have many government officials in the US.

But what would things look like if the government did topple?

How is power wielded in today’s Iran?

Founded in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has democratic, theocratic and authoritarian elements to its governing structure.

The founding figure of the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, envisioned a state run by Islamic clerics and jurists who ensured all policies adhered to Islamic law.

As Iran was a constitutional monarchy before the revolution, theocratic elements were effectively grafted on top of the existing republican ones, such as the parliament, executive and judiciary.

Iran has a unicameral legislature (one house of parliament), called the Majles, and a president (currently Masoud Pezeshkian). There are regular elections for both.

But while there are democratic elements within this system, in practice it is a “closed loop” that keeps the clerical elite in power and prevents challenges to the supreme leader. There is a clear hierarchy, with the supreme leader at the top.

Khamenei has been in power for more than 35 years, taking office following Khomeini’s death in 1989. The former president of Iran, he was chosen to become supreme leader by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body of Islamic jurists.

While members of the assembly are elected by the public, candidates must be vetted by the powerful 12-member Guardian Council (also known as the Constitutional Council). Half of this body is selected by the supreme leader, while the other half is approved by the Majles.

The council also has the power to vet all candidates for president and the parliament.

In last year’s elections, the Guardian Council disqualified many candidates from running for president, as well as the Majles and Assembly of Experts, including the moderate former president Hassan Rouhani.

As such, the supreme leader is increasingly facing a crisis of legitimacy with the public. Elections routinely have low turnout. Even with a reformist presidential candidate in last year’s field – the eventual winner, Masoud Pezeshkian – turnout was below 40% in the first round.

Freedom House gives Iran a global freedom score of just 11 out of 100.

The supreme leader also directly appoints the leaders in key governance structures, such as the judiciary, the armed forces and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The all-powerful IRGC

So, Iran is far from a democracy. But the idea that regime change would lead to a full democracy that is aligned with Israel and the US is very unlikely.

Iranian politics is extremely factional. Ideological factions, such as the reformists, moderates and conservatives, often disagree vehemently on key policy areas. They also jockey for influence with the supreme leader and the rest of the clerical elite. None of these factions is particularly friendly with the US, and especially not Israel.

There are also institutional factions. The most powerful group in the country is the clerical elite, led by the supreme leader. The next most powerful faction would be the IRGC.

Originally formed as a kind of personal guard for the supreme leader, the IRGC’s fighting strength now rivals that of the regular army.

The IRGC is extremely hardline politically. At times, the IRGC’s influence domestically has outstripped that of presidents, exerting significant pressure on their policies. The guard only vocally supports presidents in lockstep with Islamic revolutionary doctrine.

In addition to its control over military hardware and its political influence, the guard is also entwined with the Iranian economy.

The IRGC is heavily enriched by the status quo, with some describing it as a “kleptocratic” institution. IRGC officials are often awarded state contracts, and are allegedly involved in managing the “black economy” used to evade sanctions.

Given all of this, the IRGC would be the most likely political institution to take control of Iran if the clerical elite were removed from power.

In peacetime, the general consensus is the IRGC would not have the resources to orchestrate a coup if the supreme leader died. But in a time of war against a clear enemy, things could be different.

Possible scenarios post-Khamenei

So, what might happen if Israel were to assassinate the supreme leader?

One scenario would be a martial law state led by the IRGC, formed at least in the short term for the purposes of protecting the revolution.

In the unlikely event the entire clerical leadership is decimated, the IRGC could attempt to reform the Assembly of Experts and choose a new supreme leader itself, perhaps even supporting Khamenei’s son’s candidacy.

Needless to say, this outcome would not lead to a state more friendly to Israel or the US. In fact, it could potentially empower a faction that has long argued for a more militant response to both.

Another scenario is a popular uprising. Netanyahu certainly seems to think this is possible, saying in an interview in recent days:

The decision to act, to rise up this time, is the decision of the Iranian people.

Indeed, many Iranians have long been disillusioned with their government – even with more moderate and reformist elements within it. Mass protests have broken out several times in recent decades – most recently in 2022 – despite heavy retaliation from law enforcement.

We’ve seen enough revolutions to know this is possible – after all, modern Iran was formed out of one. But once again, new political leadership being more friendly to Israel and the West is not a foregone conclusion.

It is possible for Iranians to hold contempt in their hearts for both their leaders and the foreign powers that would upend their lives.

Andrew Thomas, Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.