Wellett Potter, University of New England

This week Disney, Universal Pictures and Warner Bros Discovery jointly sued MiniMax, a Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) company, over alleged copyright infringement.

The three Hollywood media giants allege MiniMax (which operates Hailuo AI and is reportedly valued at US$4 billion) engaged in mass copyright infringement of characters such as Darth Vader and Mickey Mouse by scraping vast amounts of copyrighted data to train their models without permission or payment.

This lawsuit is the latest in a growing list of copyright infringement cases involving AI. These cases include authors, publishers, newspapers, music labels and independent musicians around the world.

Disney, Universal Pictures and Warner Bros Discovery have the resources to litigate hard and possibly shape future precedent. They are seeking damages and an injunction against the ongoing use of their material.

Cases like this one suggest the common approach of “scraping first” and dealing with consequences later may be unsustainable. Other methods for ethically, morally and legally obtaining data are urgently needed.

One method some people are starting to explore is licensed use. So what exactly does that mean – and is it really a solution to the growing copyright problems AI presents?

What is licensing?

Licensing is a legal mechanism which allows the use of creative works under agreed terms, often for a fee. It usually involves two key players: the copyright owner (for example, a movie studio) and the user of the creative work (for example, an AI company).

Generally, a non-exclusive licence is where, in return for a fee, the copyright owner gives the user permission to exercise certain rights but retains ownership of the work.

In the context of generative AI use, granting a non-exclusive license could result in AI companies gaining permission for use and paying a fee. They could use the copyright owner’s material for training purposes, rather than simply scraping without consent.

There are several licensing models, which are already being used in some AI contexts. These include voluntary, collective and statutory licensing models.

What are these models?

Voluntary licensing happens when a copyright owner directly permits an AI company to use their work, usually for a payment. It can work for large, high-value deals. For example, the Associated Press licensed their archive to OpenAI, the owner of ChatGPT.

However, when there are thousands of copyright owners involved who each own a smaller number of works, this method is slow, cumbersome and expensive.

Another problem is that once a generative AI company has made one copy of a work under license, it is uncertain whether this copy may be used for other tasks. Also, applying voluntary licensing to AI training is hard to scale, because training requires vast datasets.

This makes individual agreements with each copyright owner impractical. It can be complex in terms of determining who owns the rights, what should be cleared and how much to pay. The licensing fee may also be prohibitive to smaller AI firms, and individual copyright owners may not receive much revenue for the use.

Collective licensing allows copyright owners to have their rights managed by an organisation known as a collecting society. The society negotiates with the user and distributes licensing fees to the copyright owners.

This model is already commonly used in the publishing and music industries. In theory, if it is expanded to the AI industry, it could provide AI companies with access to large catalogues of data more efficiently.

There are already some examples. In April 2025, a collective license for generative AI use was announced in the United Kingdom. Earlier this month, another was announced in Sweden.

However, this model raises questions about fee structures, and the actual use itself. How would fees be calculated? How much would be paid? What constitutes “use” in AI training? It is uncertain whether copyright owners with smaller catalogues would benefit as much as big players.

A statutory (or compulsory) licensing scheme is another option. It already exists in other contexts in Australia such as education and government use. Under such a model, the government could permit AI firms to use works for training without requiring permission from each copyright owner.

A fee would be paid into a central scheme at a predetermined rate. This approach would ensure AI companies access training data while ensuring some remuneration to copyright owners. However, it removes copyright owners’ ability to say no to the use.

A risk of domination

In practice, these licensing models sit on a spectrum with variations. Together, they represent some future ways the rights of creators may be reconciled with AI companies’ hunger for data.

Different forms of licensing offer potential opportunities for copyright owners and AI companies. It is by no means a silver bullet.

Voluntary agreements can be slow, fragmented and not result in much revenue for copyright owners. Collective schemes raise questions about fairness and transparency. Statutory models risk under-valuing creative work and rendering copyright owners powerless over the use of their work.

These challenges highlight a much bigger issue which is raised when copyright is considered in new technological contexts. That is, how to strike a balance between those involved, while still promoting fairness and innovation.

If a careful balance is not struck, there is a risk of domination from a handful of powerful AI companies and media giants.

Wellett Potter, Lecturer in Law, University of New England

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Rod Sims, The University of Melbourne

Australia’s new emission reduction target of 62–70% by 2035 is meant to demonstrate we are doing our part to hold climate change well below 2°C.

The new target can just about do this if we hit the upper end of the range.

To get there, Climate Change and Energy Minister Chris Bowen today outlined new funding to help industry go clean and boost clean energy financing and clean fuels.

On top of our existing policies, these don’t look to be enough to trigger the step change needed. But there is a deeper problem. At present, the government’s approach is one of command and control. Canberra is deciding what goes ahead and what doesn’t. This approach is not only inefficient but has a very real limit – how far the public purse will stretch.

Far and away the best option to rapidly cut emissions is to once again price carbon. When it costs money to emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, markets start shifting huge amounts of money into clean alternatives. The funds raised can help strengthen the budget – and compensate consumers, who are currently not being compensated for current policy costs.

The question now is whether the government can shake off their memory of the political turmoil around the introduction of the last carbon price introduced in 2012 – especially given this turmoil had much to do with constant leadership changes.

Is this range the “sweet spot”?

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described the long-anticipated 2035 target range as a “sweet spot”, while Minister Bowen said anything more ambitious than 70% was not achievable.

While this focus on achievability is commendable, it’s also unfortunately true that Australia’s remaining carbon budget is shrinking rapidly.

Globally, this budget represents the emissions that can still be emitted with a good chance of keeping warming under 2°C. Australia’s share is about 10 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent between 2013 and 2050, when we have pledged to hit net zero.

At present, our emissions are about 440 million tonnes a year, which would mean using up our budget by 2036 – well short of 2050. So we must accelerate emission reduction.

Some experts argue a lower target than just announced is appropriate, given policies aren’t in place to achieve more. But this is self-defeating – the focus must be on having the appropriate policies.

Reaching this target requires better policies

Australia’s current suite of policies are leading to slow declines in emissions.

Unfortunately, the government’s new and existing policies don’t seem up to the task of meeting the 43% by 2030 target, let alone the new 62–70% cuts five years later.

To date, the government has heavily relied on two policies to bring emissions down. Both have flaws.

The first is the Capacity Investment Scheme, which underwrites renewable energy generation and storage projects. In the absence of a carbon price, the government needs to underwrite projects as there is no green premium to create incentives for market-led investment. The government, not the market, is deciding which clean energy projects proceed.

Underwriting new projects comes with a large contingent liability, as the Commonwealth budget is partly underwriting these projects. The scheme is proceeding more slowly than the government hoped.

The second is the Safeguard Mechanism, which requires major industrial emitters to progressively lower their emissions. The scheme covers less than 30% of the economy and applies to emissions intensity rather than overall emissions, meaning higher production can lead to higher emissions.

Today, the government announced A$5 billion to support large industrial facilities to make major investments in decarbonisation and energy efficiency, $1 billion for a clean fuel fund, $2 billion to accelerate renewable project rollout and additional funding for household decarbonisation and kerbside EV charging. As it stands, these don’t seem sufficient.

Outside the land use sector, Australia’s emissions have remained broadly flat since 2005. They haven’t risen sharply, but they have not declined. If the government restricts itself to small adjustments to existing policies, this is unlikely to change.

Time to look at a carbon price

It would be far simpler to reintroduce a carbon price.

For two years from June 2012, Australia had a carbon price. It worked. Markets funded lower-emission power sources over higher-emission ones. But the scheme became politically fraught and was repealed. Since then, pricing carbon has been seen as politically unviable.

This paralysis is unfortunate. We need to judge what is politically possible today, not what happened a decade ago. Notably, in 2021, the Morrison Coalition government released modelling showing a carbon price would be necessary to reach net zero.

With a carbon price off the table, the government is left with expensive and slow policies. Worse, it faces significant political risks if it fails to meet its own targets while increasing costs to consumers – without the revenue a carbon price could provide as compensation.

Much of the debate over carbon pricing is between supporters of climate action and those who oppose any action to reduce emissions. Those wanting climate action have been forced to fight on weaker ground defending inefficient measures. It’s counterproductive not to use the most efficient mechanism to reduce emissions.

Unlock the private sector – by pricing carbon

To make real headway towards cutting emissions, Australia needs to energise the private sector.

Here, too, the best way is to price carbon. This would mean fossil fuel producers and users would have to pay for the damage their products do. Without this incentive to reduce emissions, companies will not take action.

The fault lies with government. Having identified greenhouse emissions as a major and growing problem, successive governments have refused to take the obvious step to fix it: make pollution cost money.

In 2025, it’s very unlikely any private investor will build new fossil fuel generation, other than gas peaking plants to firm renewables. No investor will build extremely expensive and slow nuclear plants.

That means the electricity grid can only meet rising demand – particularly from the enormous growth in data centres – if we add much more renewable energy, firmed by storage or gas.

Over time, the budget would improve from the proceeds of the carbon price, and productivity would grow as Australia’s expensive and somewhat arbitrary methods of cutting emissions would no longer be needed.

A carbon price is needed now to underpin our electricity market, and so our economy, improve our budget position and productivity – and to meet or surpass new emission reduction targets.

2035 is just ten years away. If the government prices carbon, Australia could achieve very rapid reductions – potentially as high as 75%.

Rod Sims, Enterprise Professor, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese put the best face on the situation after his plan to sign a major defence treaty with Papua New Guinea while in Port Moresby fell through.

Albanese said he expected the signing of the treaty – of which the wording was approved – to be finalised “in coming weeks”.

The government hopes the coming regular annual ministerial meeting between the two countries, on a date to be fixed, would provide the opportunity to finally land the treaty. Australia is hosting the meeting this year.

Instead of the treaty signing, Albanese and PNG Prime Minister James Marape issued a joint communique saying the two countries had agreed on a text of a Mutual Defence Treaty “which will be signed following Cabinet processes in both countries”.

The treaty would “elevate the defence relationship between Papua New Guinea and Austrlia. to an Alliance”, it said.

This is the second time within weeks Albanese’s plans for finalising a treaty with a regional country have been dashed. Last week he was unable to land a $500 million agreement with Vanuatu.

Albanese has been in PNG this week for the 50th anniversary of the country’s independence. Earlier in the week, he said the signing had been delayed because a PNG cabinet quorum could not be summoned after cabinet members had returned to their home areas for the celebrations.

Albanese told a joint Wednesday news conference with Marape: “We respect the processes of the Papua New Guinea government. What this is about is the processes of their cabinet.”

Both leaders made the point that the treaty had been sought by PNG.

Asked whether the signing delay could open a window for China to try to scuttle the deal, Marape said there was “no way, shape or form” that China could have any hand in telling PNG not to have the treaty.

While it had been a friend of PNG for the last 50 years, China knew that PNG had “security partners of choice,” Marape said.

But he said that in the next couple of days he would send the PNG defence minister first to China and then to other countries, including the United States, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines “to inform them all exactly what this is all about”.

The joint communique said the proposed Pukpuk treaty would include “a mutual defence Alliance which recognises that an armed attack on Australia or Papua New Guinea would be a danger to the peace and security of both countries”.

In other provisions the treaty also covers the recruitment of PNG citizens into the Australian Defence Force.

It would also ensure “any activities, agreements or arrangements with third parties would not compromise the ability” of PNG or Australia to implement the treaty.

Albanese said the treaty would “be Australia’s first new alliance in more than 70 years and only the third in our entire history, along with the ANZUS treaty with New Zealand and the United States”.

Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.