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Officially, the unemployment rate is 4.2%. But that doesn’t count all the hidden workers

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Officially, the unemployment rate is 4.2%. But that doesn’t count all the hidden workers in Australia

Sora Lee, La Trobe University

Australia’s job market is facing a paradox. Employers across every major sector – from construction to healthcare – report crippling skills shortages.

A key measure of skills shortages, the proportion of advertised vacancies filled, shows 30.3% of surveyed occupations were in shortage in the March quarter.

Yet there are more than two million people – hidden workers – who remain on the fringes of the labour market. They might just be a missing piece in solving Australia’s talent crisis.

This mismatch is more than a numbers problem – it’s a systemic failure to connect the untapped talent with unmet industry demand.

Businesses need to rethink rigid hiring practices, challenge outdated stereotypes and create pathways for those sidelined from work. Policymakers need to build in targeted pathways that connect their skills to shortage areas.

Who are the hidden workers?

Each month, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) releases official data on the labour force: new jobs created, the unemployment rate and other measures. But these figures don’t tell the whole story.

Collectively, the term hidden workers encompasses:

  • people who are underemployed (working one or more part-time job but willing and able to work full-time)
  • the unemployed (without work but seeking work)
  • discouraged workers (who are not currently working or looking, but are willing and able to work if the right circumstances arise).

Using nationally representative data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, our research reveals some patterns of hidden workers.

Women are predominant among the hidden workers, reflecting ongoing gendered divisions in caregiving. Half of the discouraged workers, who have given up looking for work, are over 41.

Those with lower educational attainment (below Year 12) are more likely to be discouraged or unemployed. Hidden workers often lack networks or live in disadvantaged areas.

It’s not just discouraged workers

Our research shows hidden workers make up 21.1% of Australians aged 15 and over, according to the HILDA 2022 survey data. We use broader definitions of discouraged workers and the underemployed than the ABS does, and we include people over 65. The ABS, which uses a different survey and methods, arrives at a rate of about 17%. We explain these differences in further detail below.

Discouraged workers are most common among the youngest and oldest age groups, comprising 43.17% of hidden workers. Discouraged workers are a big part of the story, but not the whole picture.

Many hidden workers are underemployed (39.1%). They are actively working, but in casual or part-time jobs that don’t give them the hours or income they need. Working parents, especially mothers, are underemployed in unstable part-time roles, juggling caregiving responsibilities.

Findings from another study which analyses the probabilities of becoming a hidden worker, confirms women’s participation in the labour market is hindered at various stages of life by the unequal sharing of childcare and other care responsibilities.

Limited local job opportunities and economic resources further widen the gender gap, particularly among those aged 45–64.

Why our research paints a fuller picture

The ABS defines “potential workers” as people who are willing and able to work, a group that includes both those classified as unemployed and those considered discouraged workers. However, the ABS publishes underemployment as a separate category. This mainly covers people employed part-time who wanted more hours, and were available.

However, in hidden worker research, underemployed workers are defined more broadly, as people who want more hours and can’t get them, without the readiness-to-start condition.

By grouping them as a category under hidden workers, we get a fuller picture of the “missing” labour that could be mobilised if structural and systemic barriers were addressed.

My research into hidden workers stems not just from academic curiosity, but from my own experience. As a newly completed PhD, a migrant woman of culturally and linguistically diverse background, and a mother of two young children, I found it challenging to navigate a labour market that didn’t fully recognise my skills, experience or potential.

Despite being “willing and able to work”, I was underemployed, unemployed and then discouraged.

Why does this matter for the economy?

Australia cannot afford to address only the visible tip of the labour market iceberg. The hidden workers in Australia are a vital yet invisible part of the workforce.

Bringing hidden workers into policy focus is not only an economic priority, but also a public health imperative. A young hidden worker may start out in insecure, low-paid jobs that limit access to good food, safe housing and adequate health care.

These early disadvantages don’t just affect the present. Over time, these disadvantages may compound, leading to chronic stress, mental health challenges and a higher risk of long-term illness. The accumulated disadvantages can lead to inequitable ageing.

To make a difference, job services, health care, housing and community support all need to work together so these challenges don’t keep them stuck. The Victorian state government has an initiative for a community council to help design better solutions.

Governments should link employment services with health and social protection systems to address compounding disadvantages. Unlocking this hidden workforce could be a game-changing step toward securing Australia’s economic resilience and strengthening its social fabric.The Conversation

Sora Lee, Lecturer in Ageing and End of Life, La Trobe University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Global power struggles and Arctic shipping risks

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Global power struggles over the ocean’s finite resources call for creative diplomacy

Jonas Gamso, Arizona State University and Hossain Ahmed Taufiq, Arizona State University

Oceans shape everyday life in powerful ways. They cover 70% of the planet, carry 90% of global trade, and support millions of jobs and the diets of billions of people. As global competition intensifies and climate change accelerates, the world’s oceans are also becoming the front line of 21st-century geopolitics.

How policymakers handle these challenges will affect food supplies, the price of goods and national security.

Right now, international cooperation is under strain, but there are many ways to help keep the peace. The tools of diplomacy range from formal international agreements, like the High Seas Treaty for protecting marine life, which goes into effect on Jan. 17, 2026, to deals between countries, to efforts led by companies, scientists and issue-focused organizations.

Examples of each can be found in how the world is dealing with rising tensions over Arctic shipping, seafloor mining and overfishing. As researchers in international trade and diplomacy at Arizona State University in the Thunderbird School of Global Management’s Ocean Diplomacy Lab, we work with groups affected by ocean pressures like these to identify diplomatic tools – both inside and outside government – that can help avoid conflict.

Arctic shipping: New sea lanes, new risks

As the Arctic Ocean’s sea ice cover diminishes, shipping routes that were once impassable most of the year are opening up.

For companies, these routes – such as the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s coast and the Northwest Passage through Canada’s Arctic Archipelago – promise shorter transit times, lower fuel costs and fewer choke points than traditional passages.

However, Arctic shipping also raises complex challenges.

Declining sea ice is opening two shipping routes to greater use: the Northern Sea Route, off the Russian coast, and the Northwest Passage, along Alaska’s coast and through the Canadian islands.
Susie Harder/Arctic Council

The U.S., Russia, China and several European countries have each taken steps to establish an economic and military presence in the Arctic Ocean, often with overlapping claims and competing strategic aims. For example, Russia closed off access to much of the Barents Sea while it conducted missile tests near Norway in 2025. NATO has also been patrolling the same sea.

Geopolitical tensions compound the practical dangers in Arctic waters that are poorly charted, where emergency response capacity is limited and where extreme weather is common.

As more commercial vessels move through these waters, a serious incident – whether triggered by a political confrontation or weather – could be difficult to contain and costly for marine ecosystems and global supply chains.

A fleet of military ships at dusk with mountains in the background.
German Naval vessels sail near Harstad, Norway, during Arctic exercises on Oct. 13, 2025.
Sean Gallup/Getty Images

The Arctic Council is the region’s primary official forum for the Arctic countries to work together, but it is explicitly barred from addressing military and security issues – the very pressures now reshaping Arctic shipping.

The council went dormant for over a year starting in 2022 after Russia, then the Arctic Council president, invaded Ukraine. While meetings and projects involving the remaining countries have since resumed, the council’s influence has been undercut by unilateral moves by the Trump administration and Russia, and bilateral arrangements between countries, including Russia and China, often involving access to oil, gas and critical mineral deposits.

In this context, Arctic countries can strengthen cooperation through other channels. An important one is science.

For decades, scientists from the U.S., Europe, Russia and other countries collaborated on research related to public safety and the environment, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine disrupted those research networks.

Going forward, countries could share more data on ice thaw, extreme weather and emergency response to help prevent accidents in a rapidly opening shipping corridor.

An image of the Arctic shows sea ice concentrations in 2025 were less than the 20-year average, and much less than the 20 years before then.
Arctic sea ice has been declining, with less multiyear ice and less coverage. The map shows the Arctic sea ice at its minimum extent in 2025, in September.
NOAA and CIRES/University of Colorado Boulder.

Critical minerals: Control over the seabed

The global transition to clean energy is driving demand for critical minerals, such as nickel, cobalt, manganese and rare earth elements, that are essential for everything from smartphones and batteries to fighter jets. Some of the world’s largest untapped deposits lie deep below the ocean’s surface, in places like the Clarion-Clipperton Zone near Hawaii in the Pacific. This has sparked interest from governments and corporations in sea floor mining.

Harvesting critical minerals from the seabed could help meet demand at a time when China controls much of the global critical mineral supply. But deep-sea ecosystems are poorly understood, and disruptions from mining would have unknown consequences for ocean health. Forty countries now support either a ban or a pause on deep sea mining until the risks are better understood.

These concerns sit alongside geopolitical tensions: Most deep-sea minerals lie in international waters, where competition over access and profits could become another front in global rivalry.

A map shows one area where companies are interested in mining.
A map of the Pacific Ocean between Mexico and Hawaii shows exploration targets for mining seafloor nodules that contain critical minerals in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. National waters are shown in blue. The striped APEI squares are protected areas.
KA McQuaid, MJ Attrill, MR Clark, A Cobley, AG Glover, CR Smith and KL Howell, 2020, CC BY

The International Seabed Authority was created under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to manage seabed resources, but its efforts to establish binding mining rules have stalled. The U.S. never ratified the convention, and the Trump administration is now trying to fast-track its own permits to circumvent the international process and accelerate deep-sea mining in areas that are outside national jurisdictions.

Against this backdrop, a loose coalition of issue-focused groups and companies have joined national governments in calling for a pause on deep-sea mining. At the same time, some insurers have declined to insure deep-sea mining projects.

A visualization of deep-sea mining and the debris clouds created that could harm sea life.

Pressure from outside groups will not eliminate competition over seabed resources, but it can shape behavior by raising the costs of moving too quickly without carefully evaluating the risks. For example, Norway recently paused deep-sea mining licenses until 2029, while BMW, Volvo and Google have pledged not to purchase metals produced from deep-sea mines until environmental risks are better understood.

Overfishing: When competition outruns cooperation

Fishing fleets have been ranging farther and fishing longer in recent decades, leading to overfishing in many areas. For coastal communities, the result can crash fish stocks, threatening jobs in fishing and processing and degrading marine ecosystems, which makes coastal areas less attractive for tourism and recreation. When stocks decline, seafood prices also rise.

Unlike deep-sea mining or Arctic shipping, overfishing is prompting cooperation on many levels.

In 2025, a critical mass of countries ratified the High Seas Treaty, which sets out a legal framework for creating marine protected areas in international waters that could give species a chance to recover. Meanwhile, several countries have arrangements with their neighbors to manage fishing together.

For example, the European Union and U.K. are finalizing an agreement to set quotas for fleets operating in waters where fish stocks are shared. Likewise, Norway and Russia have established annual quotas for the Barents Sea to try to limit overfishing. These government-led efforts are reinforced by other forms of diplomacy that operate outside government.

Market-based initiatives like the Marine Stewardship Council certification set common sustainability standards for fishing companies to meet. Many major retailers look for that certification when making purchases. Websites like Global Fishing Watch monitor fishing activity in near real time, giving governments and advocacy groups data for action.

Collectively, these efforts make it harder for illegal fishing to hide.

How well countries are able to work together to update quotas, share data and enforce rules as warming oceans shift where fish stocks are found and demand continues to grow will determine whether overfishing can be stopped.

Looking Ahead

At a time when international cooperation is under strain, agreements between countries and pressure from companies, insurers and issue-focused groups are essential for ensuring a healthy ocean for the future.The Conversation

Jonas Gamso, Associate Professor and Deputy Dean of Knowledge Enterprise for the Thunderbird School of Global Management, Arizona State University and Hossain Ahmed Taufiq, Postdoctoral Fellow of Ocean Diplomacy and Leadership, Arizona State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Why Greenland matters in a multipolar world

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Four ways to understand what’s going on with the US, Denmark and Greenland

Shutterstock/Michal Balada

Ian Manners, Lund University

European countries, and Denmark in particular, are scrambling to respond to threats from US officials over the future of Greenland.

Having successfully taken out the leadership of Venezuela in a raid on January 3, an emboldened US government is talking about simply taking Greenland for itself.

Various European leaders have expressed their concern but haven’t been able to formulate a coherent response to the betrayal by a supposed ally.

Since the September 11 attacks in 2001, Danish governments have willingly participated in US-led invasions of Afghanistan (2001-2021) and Iraq (2003-2007). The rightward movement across the Danish political spectrum had led to Denmark rejecting some Nordic and EU cooperation in favour of pro-US transatlanticism.

However, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine led to a rethink of Danish foreign policy. The country joined the EU’s common security and defence policy and tightened cooperation with recent Nato members Finland and Sweden.

And when Trump came to power for the second time, the chaotic rightward swing of US foreign policy left Denmark reaching out for support from its EU colleagues over the challenge to Greenland.

While a member of the European Union, Denmark has placed itself at the bloc’s periphery since copying the UK in opting out of the euro and from cooperation in justice and home affairs. But any US invasion of Greenland is likely to break Denmark’s fixed exchange rate policy with the euro (and before that the deutschmark) that has been in place since 1982. So there are economic implications as well as territorial.

The fallout from the US’s threats, and certainly any US intervention in Greenland, go much further than Denmark. While the EU tried to stay in step with the US in its support of Ukraine during Joe Biden’s presidency, since the re-election of Trump, EU member states have very much fallen out with the US. During 2025, the US and EU clashed over trade and tariffs, social media regulation, environment and agriculture policies.

But the latest developments demonstrate that Trump’s US can no longer be trusted as a long-term ally – to Greenland and Denmark, the EU and Europe.

This is a crisis engulfing many countries and triggered by many drivers. In order to understand this complex situation, we can use four different analytical approaches from academic thinking. These can help us contextualise not just the Greenland case, but also the emerging multipolar world of “might makes right”.

1. Realism

Currently the most popular approach comes from within the conservative tradition of “realism”. This predicts every state will act in their own national interest.

In this framing, Trump’s actions are part of the emergence of a multipolar world, in which the great powers are the US, China, India and Russia. In this world, it makes sense for Russia to invade Ukraine to counter the US, for the US to seize assets in Venezuela and Greenland to counter China, and for China to invade Taiwan to counter the US.

2. The new elites

Many think that to understand the events of the past few years, including Trump’s return and Vladimir Putin’s foreign policies, you need to look beyond conservative or liberal explanations to seek out who holds power and influence in the global superpowers. That means the wealthy families, corporations and oligarchs who exert control over the politics of the ruling elite through media and campaign power and finance.

In the cases of Venezuela and Greenland there are two factors at work – the US rejection of the rule of law and the desire for personal wealth via energy resources. But the timing is also important. The operation in Venezuela has been the only story to eclipse the Epstein files in the news in many months.

3. The decline of the liberal order

Many academic explanations see these recent events in the context of the decline of a “liberal order” dominated by the US, Europe, the “developed world” and the UN. In this view, the actions of Putin and Trump are seen as the last days of international law, the importance of the UN, and what western nations see as a system based on multilateralism.

However, this approach tends to overlook the continued dominance of the global north in these systems. The lack of support for the US and EU’s defence of Ukraine has been repeatedly demonstrated in the unwillingness of many global south countries, including China and India, to condemn the Russian invasion in the UN general assembly. It would be interesting to see how such voting would play out if it related to a US invasion of Greenland.

4. The planetary approach

The final – and most important – view is found in the planetary politics approach. This approach is based on the simple observation that so many planetary crises, such as global heating, mass extinctions of wildlife, climate refugees, rising autocracy and the return of international conflict are deeply interrelated and so can only be understood when considered together.

From this perspective it is Greenland’s sustainability and Greenlanders’ lives that must shape the understanding of Denmark’s and other European responses to Trump’s claims. It is through acknowledging the deep relationship that indigenous people have to their ecology that solutions can be found.

And Greenlanders have already expressed their vision for the future. Living on the frontline of the climate crisis, they want an economy built on resilience – not on ego-driven political drama.

While it’s quick and easy to to judge the events in Venezuela or Greenland in terms of the daily news cycle, the four perspectives set out here force people to think for themselves how best to understand complex international crises.

There is, however, a final observation to emphasise. Only one of these perspectives is likely to bring any way of thinking ourselves out of our planetary political crisis.The Conversation

Ian Manners, Professor, Department of Political Science, Lund University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Pentagon’s AI gamble: Is Grok safe for defense?

Pentagon to integrate Elon Musk’s AI chatbot Grok, exploring military data and innovation amid AI controversies.

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Pentagon to integrate Elon Musk’s AI chatbot Grok, exploring military data and innovation amid AI controversies.


Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that Elon Musk’s AI chatbot Grok will soon be integrated with the Pentagon’s networks.

The move aims to harness military data to develop advanced AI technology, despite recent controversies surrounding Grok’s content generation. This integration signals a bold step toward combining commercial AI tools with national defence systems.

Dr Karen Sutherland from UniSC explores the implications of this partnership. We discuss how Hegseth’s approach to AI differs from the Biden administration’s framework, the measures in place to ensure responsible use, and the limitations on Grok’s image generation capabilities.

We also examine the potential risks and international reactions, as well as Hegseth’s vision for innovation within the military. From civil rights considerations to prioritising key technologies, this story highlights the complex balancing act of AI in modern defence.

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