Andrew Thomas, Deakin University

The timing and targets of Israel’s attacks on Iran tell us that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s short-term goal is to damage Iran’s nuclear facilities in order to severely diminish its weapons program.

But Netanyahu has made clear another goal: he said the war with Iran “could certainly” lead to regime change in the Islamic republic.

These comments came after an Israeli plan to assassinate the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was reportedly rebuffed by United States President Donald Trump.

It’s no secret Israel has wanted to see the current government of Iran fall for some time, as have many government officials in the US.

But what would things look like if the government did topple?

How is power wielded in today’s Iran?

Founded in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has democratic, theocratic and authoritarian elements to its governing structure.

The founding figure of the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, envisioned a state run by Islamic clerics and jurists who ensured all policies adhered to Islamic law.

As Iran was a constitutional monarchy before the revolution, theocratic elements were effectively grafted on top of the existing republican ones, such as the parliament, executive and judiciary.

Iran has a unicameral legislature (one house of parliament), called the Majles, and a president (currently Masoud Pezeshkian). There are regular elections for both.

But while there are democratic elements within this system, in practice it is a “closed loop” that keeps the clerical elite in power and prevents challenges to the supreme leader. There is a clear hierarchy, with the supreme leader at the top.

Khamenei has been in power for more than 35 years, taking office following Khomeini’s death in 1989. The former president of Iran, he was chosen to become supreme leader by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body of Islamic jurists.

While members of the assembly are elected by the public, candidates must be vetted by the powerful 12-member Guardian Council (also known as the Constitutional Council). Half of this body is selected by the supreme leader, while the other half is approved by the Majles.

The council also has the power to vet all candidates for president and the parliament.

In last year’s elections, the Guardian Council disqualified many candidates from running for president, as well as the Majles and Assembly of Experts, including the moderate former president Hassan Rouhani.

As such, the supreme leader is increasingly facing a crisis of legitimacy with the public. Elections routinely have low turnout. Even with a reformist presidential candidate in last year’s field – the eventual winner, Masoud Pezeshkian – turnout was below 40% in the first round.

Freedom House gives Iran a global freedom score of just 11 out of 100.

The supreme leader also directly appoints the leaders in key governance structures, such as the judiciary, the armed forces and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The all-powerful IRGC

So, Iran is far from a democracy. But the idea that regime change would lead to a full democracy that is aligned with Israel and the US is very unlikely.

Iranian politics is extremely factional. Ideological factions, such as the reformists, moderates and conservatives, often disagree vehemently on key policy areas. They also jockey for influence with the supreme leader and the rest of the clerical elite. None of these factions is particularly friendly with the US, and especially not Israel.

There are also institutional factions. The most powerful group in the country is the clerical elite, led by the supreme leader. The next most powerful faction would be the IRGC.

Originally formed as a kind of personal guard for the supreme leader, the IRGC’s fighting strength now rivals that of the regular army.

The IRGC is extremely hardline politically. At times, the IRGC’s influence domestically has outstripped that of presidents, exerting significant pressure on their policies. The guard only vocally supports presidents in lockstep with Islamic revolutionary doctrine.

In addition to its control over military hardware and its political influence, the guard is also entwined with the Iranian economy.

The IRGC is heavily enriched by the status quo, with some describing it as a “kleptocratic” institution. IRGC officials are often awarded state contracts, and are allegedly involved in managing the “black economy” used to evade sanctions.

Given all of this, the IRGC would be the most likely political institution to take control of Iran if the clerical elite were removed from power.

In peacetime, the general consensus is the IRGC would not have the resources to orchestrate a coup if the supreme leader died. But in a time of war against a clear enemy, things could be different.

Possible scenarios post-Khamenei

So, what might happen if Israel were to assassinate the supreme leader?

One scenario would be a martial law state led by the IRGC, formed at least in the short term for the purposes of protecting the revolution.

In the unlikely event the entire clerical leadership is decimated, the IRGC could attempt to reform the Assembly of Experts and choose a new supreme leader itself, perhaps even supporting Khamenei’s son’s candidacy.

Needless to say, this outcome would not lead to a state more friendly to Israel or the US. In fact, it could potentially empower a faction that has long argued for a more militant response to both.

Another scenario is a popular uprising. Netanyahu certainly seems to think this is possible, saying in an interview in recent days:

The decision to act, to rise up this time, is the decision of the Iranian people.

Indeed, many Iranians have long been disillusioned with their government – even with more moderate and reformist elements within it. Mass protests have broken out several times in recent decades – most recently in 2022 – despite heavy retaliation from law enforcement.

We’ve seen enough revolutions to know this is possible – after all, modern Iran was formed out of one. But once again, new political leadership being more friendly to Israel and the West is not a foregone conclusion.

It is possible for Iranians to hold contempt in their hearts for both their leaders and the foreign powers that would upend their lives.

Andrew Thomas, Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Ian Parmeter, Australian National University

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could last for at least two weeks.

His timing seems precise for a reason. The Israel Defence Forces and the country’s intelligence agencies have clearly devised a methodical, step-by-step campaign.

Israeli forces initially focused on decapitating the Iranian military and scientific leadership and, just as importantly, destroying virtually all of Iran’s air defences.

Israeli aircraft can not only operate freely over Iranian air space now, they can refuel and deposit more special forces at key sites to enable precision bombing of targets and attacks on hidden or well-protected nuclear facilities.

In public statements since the start of the campaign, Netanyahu has highlighted two key aims: to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, and to encourage the Iranian people to overthrow the clerical regime.

With those two objectives in mind, how might the conflict end? Several broad scenarios are possible.

A return to negotiations

US President Donald Trump’s special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, was to have attended a sixth round of talks with his Iranian counterparts on Sunday aimed at a deal to replace the Iran nuclear agreement negotiated under the Obama administration in 2015. Trump withdrew from that agreement during his first term in 2018, despite Iran’s apparent compliance to that point.

Netanyahu was opposed to the 2015 agreement and has indicated he does not believe Iran is serious about a replacement.

So, accepting negotiations as an outcome of the Israeli bombing campaign would be a massive climbdown by Netanyahu. He wants to use the defanging of Iran to reestablish his security credentials after the Hamas attacks of October 2023.

Even though Trump continues to press Iran to accept a deal, negotiations are off the table for now. Trump won’t be able to persuade Netanyahu to stop the bombing campaign to restart negotiations.

Complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program

Destruction of Iran’s nuclear program would involve destroying all known sites, including the Fordow uranium enrichment facility, about 100 kilometres south of Tehran.

According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi, the facility is located about half a mile underground, beneath a mountain. It is probably beyond the reach of even the US’ 2,000-pound deep penetration bombs.

The entrances and ventilation shafts of the facility could be closed by causing landslides. But that would be a temporary solution.

Taking out Fordow entirely would require an Israeli special forces attack. This is certainly possible, given Israel’s success in getting operatives into Iran to date. But questions would remain about how extensively the facility could be damaged and then how quickly it could be rebuilt.

And destruction of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges – used to enrich uranium to create a bomb – would be only one step in dismantling its program.

Israel would also have to secure or eliminate Iran’s stock of uranium already enriched to 60% purity. This is sufficient for up to ten nuclear bombs if enriched to the weapons-grade 90% purity.

But does Israeli intelligence know where that stock is?

Collapse of the Iranian regime

Collapse of the Iranian regime is certainly possible, particularly given Israel’s removal of Iran’s most senior military leaders since its attacks began on Friday, including the heads of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Iranian armed forces.

And anti-regime demonstrations over the years, most recently the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests after the death in police custody of a young Iranian woman, Mahsa Amini, in 2022, have shown how unpopular the regime is.

That said, the regime has survived many challenges since coming to power in 1979, including war with Iraq in the 1980s and massive sanctions. It has developed remarkably efficient security systems that have enabled it to remain in place.

Another uncertainty at this stage is whether Israeli attacks on civilian targets might engender a “rally round the flag” movement among Iranians.

Netanyahu said in recent days that Israel had indications the remaining senior regime figures were packing their bags in preparation for fleeing the country. But he gave no evidence.

A major party joins the fight

Could the US become involved in the fighting?

This can’t be ruled out. Iran’s UN ambassador directly accused the US of assisting Israel with its strikes.

That is almost certainly true, given the close intelligence sharing between the US and Israel. Moreover, senior Republicans, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, have called on Trump to order US forces to help Israel “finish the job”.

Trump would probably be loath to do this, particularly given his criticism of the “forever wars” of previous US administrations. But if Iran or pro-Iranian forces were to strike a US base or military asset in the region, pressure would mount on Trump to retaliate.

Another factor is that Trump probably wants the war to end as quickly as possible. His administration will be aware the longer a conflict drags on, the more likely unforeseen factors will arise.

Could Russia become involved on Iran’s side? At this stage that’s probably unlikely. Russia did not intervene in Syria late last year to try to protect the collapsing Assad regime. And Russia has plenty on its plate with the war in Ukraine.

Russia criticised the Israeli attack when it started, but appears not to have taken any action to help Iran defend itself.

And could regional powers such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates become involved?

Though they have a substantial arsenal of US military equipment, the two countries have no interest in becoming caught up in the conflict. The Gulf Arab monarchies have engaged in a rapprochement with Iran in recent years after decades of outright hostility. Nobody would want to put this at risk.

Uncertainties predominate

We don’t know the extent of Iran’s arsenal of missiles and rockets. In its initial retaliation to Israel’s strikes, Iran has been able to partially overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome air defence system, causing civilian casualties.

If it can continue to do this, causing more civilian casualties, Israelis already unhappy with Netanyahu over the Gaza war might start to question his wisdom in starting another conflict.

But we are nowhere near that point. Though it’s too early for reliable opinion polling, most Israelis almost certainly applaud Netanyahu’s action so far to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. In addition, Netanyahu has threatened to make Tehran “burn” if Iran deliberately targets Israeli civilians.

We can be confident that Iran does not have any surprises in store. Israel has severely weakened its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. They are clearly in no position to assist Iran through diversionary attacks.

The big question will be what comes after the war. Iran will almost certainly withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and forbid more inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Israel will probably be able to destroy Iran’s existing nuclear facilities, but it’s only a question of when – not if – Iran will reconstitute them.

This means the likelihood of Iran trying to secure a nuclear bomb in order to deter future Israeli attacks will be much higher. And the region will remain in a precarious place.

Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Middle East Studies, Australian National University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Michelle Grattan, University of Canberra

For the first time in memory, an Australian prime minister is approaching a prospective meeting with a US president with a distinct feeling of wariness.

Of course Anthony Albanese would deny it.

But it’s undeniable the government is relieved that Albanese’s coming trip (for which he leaves Friday) won’t feature a visit to Washington with a meeting in the Oval Office. Having seen what happened publicly to some other leaders in such encounters, Albanese has at least avoided any such risk. Instead, Albanese and President Donald Trump are expected to meet on the sidelines of the G7 in Canada.

Think about this. Normally, an Australian prime minister heading to North America would be deeply disappointed at not receiving an invitation to Washington, especially when he had not yet met the president face to face (although Albanese and Trump have had phone calls).

The non-Washington encounter is less hazardous but still highly unpredictable for Albanese.

It could go swimmingly. But that will depend on Trump’s mood on the day and what briefings he has had. And who can make sound predictions about any of that? Australian officials find the White House difficult to deal with or read.

Now, on the cusp of Albanese’s trip, a US review of AUKUS has become public.

The story appeared in the Financial Times, which quoted a Pentagon spokesperson saying the departmental review was to ensure “this initiative of the previous administration is aligned with the president’s ‘America First’ agenda”. The spokesperson noted US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth had “made clear his intent to ensure the [defence] department is focused on the Indo-Pacific region first and foremost”.

The review is to be led by the undersecretary of defence for policy, Elbridge Colby, who months ago flagged the US wanted Australia to be spending some 3% of GDP on defence. This was upped to 3.5% in a recent meeting between Defence Minister Richard Marles and Hegseth.

The Australian government is playing down the AUKUS review as being more or less routine. Marles said he has known about it for some time. He told Sky, “I am comfortable about it and I think it’s a pretty natural step for an incoming government to take and we’ll have an opportunity to engage with it”.

Nevertheless, the fact of the review and the timing of the report about it will turn the screws on Albanese over defence spending.

The prime minister makes two points on this – that Australia takes its own decisions, and that defence spending should be set on the basis of the capability needed rather than determined by a set percentage.

But there is a general view among experts that Australia will need to boost substantially its spending. Albanese won’t want to capitulate on the issue, but he will need some diplomatic lines. He could point out Australia has its next Strategic Defence Review in 2026. This is more an update on delivery than a fundamental review but could give an opportunity for a rethink.

On AUKUS, Albanese will want to reinforce its mutual benefits and importance. He canvassed AUKUS in his first call with Trump, after the presidential election.

The president may or may not be briefed on the latest attacks on the pact by two former prime ministers, triggered by the review.

Paul Keating, an unrelenting critic of the agreement, said in a statement the AUKUS review “might very well be the moment Washington saves Australia from itself”.

Malcolm Turnbull said in a social media post that the United Kingdom and the United States are conducting reviews of AUKUS but “Australia, which has the most at stake, has no review”.

The Trump–Albanese conversation could be complicated by the Australian government’s imposition this week of sanctions on two hardline Israeli ministers for inciting violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.

This action, in concert with the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway, was immediately condemned by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who called for the sanctions to be withdrawn.

All this before we even get to the issue of tariffs, and Australia offering a deal on critical minerals to try to get some concessions.

There is a lot of scripting prepared before such meetings. Albanese will have his talking points down pat. But with Trump being an “off-script” man, it is not an occasion for which the PM can be confident ahead of time that he is fully prepared.

But Albanese has one safeguard, in domestic political terms. If things went pear-shaped Australians – who have scant regard for Trump – could be expected to blame the president rather than the prime minister.

Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.