In yet another shocking act of political violence in the United States, Charlie Kirk was assassinated while debating with students at a university in Utah.

The 31-year-old, who came to fame by doing just that – debating whoever wanted to engage with him – was undeniably the most influential figure in young conversative politics.

News of his killing sent social media into an all-too familiar frenzy, with opposing political camps blaming each other for the increasingly febrile environment in contemporary America. It has also raised fears it may provoke even more violence.

Who was Charlie Kirk?

The meagre tent in which Kirk would set up shop on university campuses around America to engage in debate with university students should not be mistaken for meagre support.

Kirk’s political organisation, Turning Point USA (TPUSA), had a revenue of US$78,000 (A$118,000) when he founded it in 2012. As of last year, its annual revenue had grown to US$85 million (A$129 million).

His podcast, The Charlie Kirk Show, boasted between 500,000 and 750,000 downloads for each episode, ranking it as one of the top 25 most listened to podcasts in the world. Even Kirk’s 7 million X account followers is greater than MSNBC’s 5 million.

Outside the online world, TPUSA today has a presence in more than 3,500 high school and college campuses, with more than 250,000 student members, and more than 450 full- and part-time staff. But perhaps the most important metric is the fact that a TikTok survey of users under 30 found that, among those who voted for Trump, they trusted Kirk more than any other individual.

As much as Kirk’s many detractors abhorred his views and his conduct – particularly his views of Black people, Jews, trans people and immigrants, as well as his efforts to denounce professors engaging in “leftist propaganda” – there was no denying he was willing to debate practically anyone.

Whether it was in storied lecture halls at Oxford University or a progressive university campus in the US, Kirk engaged in political debate with anyone willing to come to the open microphone at his events, encouraging students to “prove me wrong”. The dissemination of clips of these interactions – typically an unwitting progressive student asking Kirk a question only to have Kirk counter-argue – garnered hundreds of millions of views across a variety of social media channels.

Support for Trump

Kirk first came to prominence championing more conventional Republican politicians, including Texas Senator Ted Cruz and former Wisconsin governor Scott Walker. But he eventually came around to supporting Trump in 2016, and never looked back.

Indeed, when many – particularly within the Republican party – sought to distance themselves from Trump after incidents such as the infamous Access Hollywood tape in 2016 or the violence at the US Capitol on January 6 2021, Kirk stayed the course.

The combination of his unceasing loyalty to Trump and his increasing popularity among young voters saw him increase his power within conservative circles. This power saw his organisation contribute millions of dollars to various Trump-aligned campaigns. TPUSA also bolstered support for embattled cabinet nominee, and now defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, and initiate efforts to oust former chair Ronna McDaniel from the Republican National Committee.

But perhaps Kirk’s most notable political win was harnessing a record number of young people to vote for Trump in 2024, despite the fact he was the oldest ever person to lead the Republican presidential ticket.

US political violence

Some may look at yet another instance of deadly US political violence and wonder whether it would have any sort of lasting impact. After all, the creation of the US followed an act of political violence known to Americans as the Revolutionary War. And this founding preceded more political violence, including the Civil War, Reconstruction and Civil Rights movement, among others.

Yet, as much as the entirety of US history is filled with such incidents, there is no denying that for the past generation in particular, it has also grown worse.

Numerous studies have found that the number of attacks and plots against elected officials, political candidates, political party officials, and political workers is exponentially higher now than in recent history. In examining 30 years of data, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found the number of attacks and plots in the past five years is nearly triple that of the preceding 25 years combined.

But beyond the numbers, US politicians themselves increasingly cite the spectre of violence as a reason why they have either retired from politics or – perhaps more worryingly – changed their votes.

Ultimately, there’s little question as to whether the US will continue to suffer from political violence. The greater question is to what extent and at what cost.

Kirk’s death will affect far more than just his friends and his family – including his widow and two young children. Today marked the loss of a unique leader in the US conservative movement.

Jared Mondschein, Director of Research, US Studies Centre, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The Chinese military parade that had the world talking last week was more than just pageantry. It was a declaration that Chinese leader Xi Jinping sees himself in a race against time to secure his place in history.

For Xi, who has just turned 72, unification with Taiwan is not just a policy aim; it is the crown jewel that would elevate him above Mao Zedong and cement his reputation as the greatest leader in modern Chinese history.

The timing and staging of the parade underscored this urgency, a showcase of power before an audience of foreign leaders and cameras at a high-stakes anniversary event in Beijing.

Mao, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, unified the country under Communist rule, but left it poor and isolated.

Xi’s mission is to finish the job by formally ending the Chinese civil war that pitted the Communists against the Nationalists and annexing the island of Taiwan to lock in his place in the party pantheon.

But waiting is dangerous. Inside the Chinese Communist Party, loyalty is transactional and rivals constantly watch for weaknesses.

In 2012, for example, Bo Xilai, a rising star and once-close ally of Xi’s, suffered a dramatic and very public downfall. The scandal could easily have consumed Xi, but he turned it into an opportunity, using Bo’s downfall to cement his own rise.

That episode remains a cautionary tale in Beijing’s elite politics: power must never falter; momentum must never slip.

More than a decade later, Xi has removed or sidelined nearly every rival and manoeuvred himself into a third term. However, he still governs with the urgency of someone who knows how quickly fortunes can turn.

US catching up on hypersonic missiles

Abroad, the strategic equation is also changing.

For years, Beijing enjoyed a headstart in hypersonic weapons, anti-ship missiles and industrial production. China’s air and advanced missile defence systems have been designed to threaten US carrier strike groups and complicate allied operations across East and North Asia.

But Washington may soon close the gap. The Pentagon requested nearly US$7 billion (A$10.6 billion) in hypersonic missile program funding in the fiscal year 2024–25, while private firms are accelerating innovation in reusable missile testbeds and propulsion.

The US Navy is repurposing Zumwalt-class destroyers for its Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic system, giving the navy its first maritime platform capable of hypersonic strike. Sea-based demonstrations of the new system are planned as soon as the program matures.

Every step narrows China’s military advantage.

US shipbuilding looking for revival, too

The industrial rivalry between China and the US is a similar story.

China currently dominates global commercial shipbuilding, a dual-use foundation that also supports naval expansion.

A recent analysis found one Chinese shipbuilder alone built more ships by tonnage in 2024 than the entire US industry has produced since the second world war. Foreign ship orders are underwriting this building capacity, which can rapidly pivot to naval platforms.

This edge has continued in 2025. Xi is counting on this industrial base to give China an edge in a future conflict over Taiwan.

However, US and allied investments in shipbuilding are starting to respond.

The Trump administration has set up a White House office dedicated to fixing US shipbuilding, while the Pentagon has requested US$47 billion (A$71 billion) for Navy ship construction in its annual budget.

Japan and South Korea, both major shipbuilders, have also added significant resources to their shipbuilding capacity in an acknowledgement of the changing power structures in East and North Asia. US politicians recently visited both countries to secure greater assistance in boosting US building capacity, too.

China is also getting older

More urgent still is the demographic clock. China’s population shrank by about two million in 2023, the second straight annual decline, as births fell to nine million, half the 2017 level.

The working-age cohort is shrinking, while the number of people over 60 years old is expected to rise to roughly a third of China’s population by the mid-2030s. This will be a major drag on growth and strain on social systems.

Demography is not destiny, but it compresses timelines for leaders who want to lock in strategic gains.

America’s competitive advantage

There is a final, often overlooked problem. The most efficient political-warfare system of the modern era is capitalism – the engine of competition that rewards adaptation and punishes failure.

The US still possesses a uniquely deep capacity for “creative destruction” – it constantly churns through firms and ideas that power long-term growth and reinvention.

That dynamism is messy, decentralised and often uncomfortable. However, it remains America’s strategic ace: it can retool industries, scale breakthrough technologies and absorb shocks faster than any centrally directed system.

China can imitate many things, but it cannot easily replicate that market-driven ecosystem of risk capital, failure tolerance and rapid reallocation.

All of this explains why Xi wants the world to believe China’s rise is unstoppable and unification with Taiwan is inevitable.

But inevitability is fragile. Beijing’s “win without fighting” approach, which involves grey-zone coercion, economic leverage and an incremental, “salami-slicing” approach to territorial claims in the South China Sea, has worked because it relies on patience and subtlety. The more Xi accelerates, the more he risks miscalculation.

A forced attempt to seize Taiwan would be the most dangerous gamble of his rule. If the People’s Liberation Army falters, the consequences would be severe: strategic humiliation abroad, political turbulence at home, and a punctured narrative of inevitability that sustains party authority.

Sun Tzu’s greatest victory is the one won without fighting, but only when time favours patience. For Xi Jinping, time is not on his side.

Ian Langford, Executive Director, Security & Defence PLuS and Professor, UNSW Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.