Home ownership in Australia was once regarded as proof of success in life. However, it remains elusive for many people today.
Prices have soared beyond wage growth, rents keep rising, and even some well-intentioned government initiatives, including those announced by Labor and the Coalition at their election campaign launches on the weekend, risk driving up demand.
What’s gone wrong?
The Grattan Institute says increasing housing supply is essential to maintain price stability over time, but notes we are not making enough progress.
Australia will miss its goal to build 1.2 million new homes within five years if we stick to the current housing policies and construction practices.
Why it’s not working
There is a wide range of reasons why Australia is failing to provide enough housing:
Fragmented policy approach: A national approach involving all levels of government aligning their policies, rules and regulations is needed.
Planning bottlenecks: Some projects face years of delay due to local council regulations and zoning requirements. The Productivity Commission has reported Australia’s planning system has excessive barriers to new projects, including medium-density developments.
Land release delays: State governments are slow to release new land for housing. This is often because of community opposition, political considerations and market dynamics. This results in limited availability, which leads to higher costs for land that can be developed.
Skills shortages: Recent immigration restrictions have worsened the shortage of skilled tradespeople in the residential construction sector.
Demand-side subsidies: Government programs, such as first home buyer grants, help some people buy homes. However, they also make housing less affordable because they can result in increased prices.
What could work without raising prices
There are various changes that could be made without necessarily raising prices.
Duplication and logjams could be removed if a national housing strategy was introduced. This should integrate policies and regulations across federal, state and local jurisdictions.
Federal grants and incentives should be tied to states meeting targets for land release, re-zoning permits and streamlined approvals.
Using innovative construction technologies can cut construction time by as much as 50%. These include prefabricated and modular building parts, which are made in factories and later assembled at the construction site.
A government update of land use and zoning permits would make it easier and faster to build medium-density housing near transport and job hubs. This is a quick way to add dwellings without sprawl.
Governments could also offer tax or planning concessions for developments that lock in affordable rents. This would help create stable, long-term rental options.
Learning from other countries
Australia can get ideas for increasing housing supply without raising prices from the experience of other countries.
Through substantial investments in social housing, Finland has significantly reduced homelessness and created stable housing options for families with limited income.
Large-scale prefab public housing originated in Singapore decades ago as a method to accelerate construction timelines and reduce expenses. Prefabrication is only used in 8% of projects in Australia at the moment.
Prefabrication is widely used in building sectors in other countries as a cheaper and faster way of responding to housing shortages. brizmaker/Shutterstock
Sweden has adopted advanced modular construction techniques, which result in 80% of homes being built off-site.
Germany employs municipal-led housing associations along with rent controls to maintain price stability and tenant protection.
And in the UK, inclusionary zoning regulations mandate that new developments either contain affordable housing units or contribute to a fund that supports affordable housing in different locations. This helps create diverse housing options in most neighborhoods.
Election promises versus real change
Significant reforms are needed – not election sweeteners. To make genuine progress, we need to invest heavily in modern construction techniques, transform housing approval processes and ensure states promptly release essential land.
The solution requires a coordinated response from federal, state and local governments. This would enable more Australians to obtain homeownership and secure rental options.
Our politicians must avoid short-term promises during elections because these threaten to return us to the destructive pattern of escalating prices and dissatisfied homebuyers. Long-term policy reform is what we need.
What we currently know about antisemitism in Australia is pieced together from a fragmented body of information produced by community organisations, researchers and law enforcement. And it is largely interpreted and translated to the public through news reporting.
Through this reporting, Australians have learned that organised criminal groups were involved in targeting Jewish communities and foreign actors also played a role.
At the same time, some data on antisemitic incidents released by security agencies has been incorrect. Other statistics produced by community organisations has been publicly challenged.
Researchers like myself have also produced data on antisemitic incidents, but this is limited in many ways.
In a nutshell, the picture of what constitutes antisemitism and how and why it has spiked in recent years is far from being clear.
This lack of clarity matters. Without a reliable understanding of what happened in the lead-up to the Bondi terror attack, which data can be trusted, and how different forms of antisemitism intersect, Australia cannot fully grasp how it reached a point where Jewish Australians were murdered at a public religious gathering.
Shedding light on this problem will be difficult, but it is essential to understand both the scale of the problem and how to respond.
Potential for more divisiveness
The royal commission established by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is designed to address many of these unresolved issues.
As set out in its terms of reference, it will examine the nature and prevalence of antisemitism in Australia and assess how it can be more effectively addressed. It will also:
Review the responses of security and law enforcement agencies
Investigate what happened before, during, and after the Bondi attack
develop recommendations aimed at strengthening social cohesion.
Social cohesion and national consensus are the stated end goals of the entire exercise. Yet, the context in which the commission is operating is highly volatile. There is a real risk that rather than repairing social cohesion, the process itself could damage it.
This risk comes from the heavy political pressure now attached to the royal commission and from the way some political actors are using it as a weapon in broader political battles, including attacks on the government.
The antisemitism debate is already a political minefield. And the commission has entered that terrain from its first day.
The decision to acknowledge the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of antisemitism in the terms of reference is likely to be used by some to delegitimise the commission altogether. Critics argue the definition can be used to silence legitimate criticism of Israel, while supporters say it draws a necessary line between political critique and antisemitic tropes.
At the same time, some politicians have questioned the appointment of Former High Court justice Virginia Bell to head the commission, which could also undermine the credibility of the inquiry.
As a result, the commission is already inflaming existing political tensions. This is deeply unfortunate because it makes the task harder for those who are genuinely focused on understanding antisemitism, responding to it effectively, and improving the safety and well-being of Jewish Australians.
Why the Christchurch royal commission was successful
Royal commissions carry strong symbolic weight. They are often implemented when something has gone badly wrong, and the social fabric feels strained. The aim is to restore trust and provide a clear public account of what happened and why.
A useful point of comparison is the royal commission that followed the Christchurch terrorist attack in New Zealand. The inquiry led to wide-ranging reforms, including changes to firearms laws, counter-terrorism frameworks, approaches to social cohesion and inclusion, hate crime and hate speech legislation, and improved support for victims and witnesses.
It also contributed to the creation of the Christchurch Call to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online. This global initiative involving governments and technology companies has been successful in limiting the spread of terrorist and violent extremist material.
However, the political and social climate in New Zealand at the time was very different. There was a stronger sense of national unity and far less public contestation about what constituted hate. The attack was also not entangled with an ongoing and deeply polarising international conflict.
In Australia, the context is far more charged. The war in Gaza continues to divide public debate, regularly spilling into domestic politics.
It’s worth noting that antisemitic attacks have not stopped after Bondi. There was a firebombing less than two weeks later. This makes the task of using a royal commission to calm tensions and rebuild trust significantly harder.
Many pieces to the puzzle
Despite these difficulties, the commission matters now more than ever. Jewish Australians need answers, and the broader public deserves to understand what actually happened.
At present, the picture of what has caused rising antisemitism and the Bondi attack is confused. Public sentiment on the war, organised crime, foreign actors and terrorist ideology all appear to intersect, but how they connect remains unclear.
Different security agencies, researchers, and community organisations hold different pieces of evidence. Without bringing these strands together, Australians cannot fully understand the problem, let alone work out how to prevent it from happening again.
The path ahead will be difficult and exposed to disruption. One obvious challenge is the risk of further attacks while the inquiry is underway. Any new incident would complicate the process.
If, for example, an attack occurred that was shown to involve formal training or links to a terrorist organisation, serious questions would arise about whether the commission’s terms of reference remain adequate, or whether additional investigative processes would be required.
The most important test will come at the end. The commission’s recommendations must be acted on, regardless of which party is in government. That follow-through is what determines whether a royal commission produces real change or becomes just a symbolic exercise.
Meeting this test will require political restraint and maturity. It will mean resisting the temptation to turn the commission into a tool for partisan conflict and instead treating it as a shared national effort to protect communities and restore trust.
As an infectious diseases physician and researcher, I’ll be keeping an eye on a few viruses in 2026 that could be poised to cause infections in unexpected places or in unexpected numbers.
Influenza A – on the cusp of a pandemic
Influenza A is a perennial threat. The virus infects a wide range of animals and has the ability to mutate rapidly. The most recent influenza pandemic – caused by the H1N1 subtype of influenza in 2009 – killed over 280,000 people worldwide in its first year, and the virus continues to circulate today. This virus was often called swine flu because it originated in pigs in Mexico before circulating around the world.
In 2026, scientists will continue to look for any evidence that H5N1 has changed enough to be transmitted from human to human – a necessary step for the start of a new influenza pandemic. The influenza vaccines currently on the market probably don’t offer protection from H5N1, but scientists are working to create vaccines that would be effective against the virus.
Mpox – worldwide and liable to worsen
Mpox virus, formerly called monkeypox virus, was first discovered in the 1950s. For many decades, it was seen rarely, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa. Contrary to its original name, the virus mostly infects rodents and occasionally crossed over into humans.
Mpox is closely related to smallpox, and infection results in a fever and painful rash that can last for weeks. There are several varieties of mpox, including a generally more severe clade I and a milder clade II. A vaccine for mpox is available, but there are no effective treatments.
In 2022, a global outbreak of clade II mpox spread to more than 100 countries that had never seen the virus before. This outbreak was driven by human-to-human transmission of the virus through close contact, often via sex.
Most people with the virus experience fever, headache and muscle aches. The illness usually lasts just a few days, but some patients have weakness that can persist for weeks. The illness can also recur after someone has initially recovered.
There are many unanswered questions about the Oropouche virus and the disease it causes, and there are no specific treatments or vaccines. For decades, infections in people were thought to occur only in the Amazon region. However, beginning in the early 2000s, cases began to show up in a larger area of South America, Central America and the Caribbean. Cases in the United States are usually among travelers returning from abroad.
In 2026, Oropouche outbreaks will likely continue to affect travelers in the Americas. The biting midge that carries Oropouche virus is found throughout North and South America, including the southeastern United States. The range of the virus could continue to expand.
Around the world, people, animals and the wider environment are dependent on each other. Vigilance for known and emerging viral threats and the development of new vaccines and treatments can help keep everyone safe.
Perhaps no one outside of Venezuela or Cuba should care more about the U.S. capture of nominal President Nicolás Maduro than the Islamic Republic of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.
Khamenei and his regime are in trouble, and it’s not clear how they would survive should the Trump administration decide to support the millions who want a new government system without Khamenei and his ilk.
Iran has no state allies that would be willing to intervene militarily on its behalf. Further, its once-powerful network of partner and proxy militias – Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and other members of the Axis of Resistance – has been rendered incapable or reluctant to get involved. And Iran’s economy is in shambles in the midst of an ongoing water crisis with no relief in sight.
Further, the Iranian people have again taken to the streets to air their grievances against harsh economic conditions as well as government corruption, mismanagement and hypocrisy, echoing similar conditions to Venezuela in recent years.
Trump’s warning and show of solidarity will likely embolden protesters, which will almost certainly cause Iran’s internal security to crack down harder, as has happened in the past. Such U.S. intervention could lead to the overthrowing of the ayatollah, intended or not. Furthermore, Maduro’s fate demonstrates that the Trump administration is willing to use military force for that purpose if deemed necessary.
As an analyst of Middle East affairs focusing on Iran, I believe that these conditions place Khamenei’s regime under greater threat today than perhaps any other time in its 46-year history.
Protesters and security forces clash in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar in a video released on Jan. 6, 2026.
Growing threats, internal and external
If Khamenei hopes to survive politically or mortally, I believe he has three options.
In hopes of restoring deterrence, Khamenei could also continue rebuilding his country’s military capabilities, which were significantly degraded during the June 2025 12-day war in which Israel and the U.S. aimed to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability.
Khameini’s problems aren’t his alone. The revolutionary theocratic system of government that he leads is in danger of falling. And his military and internal security apparatus may not have the time or ability to address its growing and interrelated internal and external threats simultaneously.
There are two fundamental factors analysts like me consider when assessing enemy threats: offensive capability to inflict damage and hostile intentions to use these capabilities to harm enemies.
Determining offensive capability involves evaluating the quality of a country or organization’s complete arsenal – air, ground, maritime, cyber and space capabilities – and how trained, disciplined, integrated and lethal their forces might be. Determining intentions involves evaluating if, when and under what conditions offensive capabilities will be used to achieve their goals.
If states hope to survive when they come under such pressure, their defense strategy should account for differences between their own military capability and the enemy’s, especially if enemies intend to attack. Or states need to convince enemies to be less hostile, if possible.
Maduro’s mistake was his inability to defend against a far superior U.S. military capability while believing that U.S. leaders would not remove him from office. Maduro gambled and lost.
Bad choices
Iran’s supreme leader faces a similar conundrum: First, there is no foreseeable path that allows Tehran to produce or acquire the military capabilities necessary to deter Israel or defeat the United States, unless Iran develops a nuclear weapon.
But as the clear weaker party, it is in Tehran’s interest to change Trump’s mind about Tehran’s hostile intent. The way to do that would be by abandoning nuclear enrichment.
In terms of threat analysis, the regime’s oft-repeated chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” perhaps have sent an easily misinterpreted message: that Iran’s hostile leaders intend to destroy the U.S. and Israel. But they simply lack the capability, for now.
President Theodore Roosevelt famously said “speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” Today, he might say that Khamenei is unwise for speaking with such vitriol considering the size of Iran’s stick. The United States and Israel possess military capabilities far superior to Iran’s – as demonstrated by the 12-day war – but they did not then share the same intent. Though both Israel and the U.S. operations shared the objective of neutralizing Iran’s nuclear capability, Israel’s objectives were more broad and included targeting senior Iranian leaders and destabilizing the regime.
To Khamenei’s momentary personal and institutional fortune, Trump immediately called for a ceasefire following U.S. B-2 strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, delineating the United States’ narrower objectives that at the time did not include regime change in Iran.
But that was before U.S. forces removed Maduro from Caracas and before the outbreak of protests in Iran, both of which coincide with Israel’s signaling preparations for Round 2 against Iran.
During Trump’s Dec. 29 press conference at Mar-a-Lago with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he warned that the U.S. could “knock the hell” out of Iran if the country reconstitutes its nuclear facilities.
This is separate from the ominuous warning that the U.S. could intervene on behalf of Iranian protesters; it would almost certainly differ in scale.
Nevertheless, a potential U.S. intervention could embolden protesters and further undermine and destabilize the Islamic Republic regime. Khamenei has predictably scoffed at and dismissed Trump’s warning.
I believe this is a serious mistake.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned on Jan. 3, 2025, that Khameini should not “play games” as Maduro did. Khamenei, Rubio said, should take Trump’s warnings seriously. I agree.
If Iran refrains from violent crackdowns on protesters, there is a chance that anti-government protestors overthrow the government. But the supreme leader’s chances of surviving a popular uprising are probably greater than surviving an unbridled U.S. or Israeli military intent on ushering in a new – post-Islamic Republic – Iran.
Otherwise, Khamenei has to address superior U.S. and Israeli military capability, quickly. But Iran is broke, and even if sanctions were not continuously strangling Iran economically, the country could probably never purchase its way to military parity with the U.S. or Israel.
Alternatively, Iran could determine that it must move quickly to develop a nuclear weapon to mitigate U.S. and Israeli military capabilities and deter future aggression. However, it is extremely unlikely Iran could do this without U.S. and Israeli intelligence discovering the project, which would immediately trigger an overwhelming military campaign that would likely expedite regime change in Iran.
And like Maduro, the supreme leader is utterly alone. None of Maduro’s closest partners – China, Russia, Cuba and even Iran – were willing to fight in his defense, despite weeks of forewarning and U.S. military buildup near Venezuela.
Under these circumstances, it may be impossible for Khamenei to address overwhelming U.S. and Israeli military capabilities. He could, however, reduce the threat by doing what is necessary to ensure the United States’ objectives for Iran remain narrow and focused on the nuclear program, which may also keep Israel at bay.
However, Khamenei would have to demonstrate unprecedented restraint from cracking down violently on protesters and a willingness to give up nuclear enrichment. Due to historical animosity and distrust toward the U.S., both are unlikely, increasing, I believe, the probability of a forthcoming Iran without Khamenei.
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