Christo Atanasov Kostov, IE University

The scenes have become grimly familiar: Russian tanks rolling into Georgia in 2008, the seizure of Crimea in 2014, the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian military jets violating European airspace, and now mysterious drone sightings closing airports across Europe.

While these may seem like disconnected events, in reality they are but chapters in a singular, focused and evolving strategy. Russia’s aim is to wield military power when necessary, engage in “grey-zone” war tactics when possible, and exert political pressure everywhere. Moscow has been doing all this for decades, with one objective in mind: to redraw Europe’s security map without triggering direct war with Nato.

This goal is neither improvised nor ambiguous, and at its core, it is irredentist – it seeks to reverse Nato’s post-Cold War expansion, and reassert a Russian sphere of influence in Europe.

This singular focus was what governed Russia’s actions in the runup to its invasion of Ukraine. In December 2021, Moscow demanded that Nato bar Ukraine and Georgia from joining the alliance, and that Nato forces withdraw to their May 1997 positions, where they were before any former Soviet states in East Europe joined Nato.

This was not a diplomatic opening gambit to the February 2022 ground invasion, but an objective in and of itself. From the Kremlin’s perspective, Nato’s enlargement is both a humiliation and an existential threat, and must be curbed at all costs.

A toolkit of pressure

Russia’s actions can be variously interpreted as sabre-rattling, brinkmanship, or diplomatic pressure. In fact, all of these labels are accurate, but Russia uses them in conjunction to blur the typical lines between diplomacy, military action and domestic propaganda. We can break Moscow’s “toolkit” of pressure down into different types of action.

• Brinkmanship to force dialogue: Military escalation, from troop build-ups to the invasion of Ukraine itself, creates crises that compel Western attention. Russia manufactures emergencies to earn negotiation leverage, as it successfully did during the Cold War, and more recently in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine from 2014 onwards.
• Grey-zone probing: Drone and jet incursions over Germany, Estonia, Denmark and Norway are deliberate tests of Nato’s detection and response capacity. They also serve more the practical purpose of collecting intelligence on radar coverage and readiness without crossing into open hostilities.
• Hybrid pressure on smaller Nato allies: Cyberattacks and energy disruptions in various EU member states are designed to test the alliance’s solidarity. Moscow singles out smaller, weaker states to foster resentment and doubt within Nato.
• Domestic theatre: For Putin, confronting the West plays well at home. As Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, recently claimed, “Europe fears its own war”. For the Kremlin, that fear reinforces the narrative that Russia is the assertive power, and that the West is indecisive.

Russia’s use of these tools is not new – it builds on strategies that have been refined since the Soviet collapse. From Transnistria to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Donbas, Moscow sustains “unresolved” wars that lock states out of Nato and the EU, preserving Russian influence indefinitely.

Russia’s ‘permanent test’

Today, the Kremlin’s strategy increasingly favours hybrid means – drones, cyberattacks, disinformation, and energy blackmail – over warfare. These are not random provocations, but a coherent campaign of testing.

Each incursion and attack serves a diagnostic purpose: Can Europe detect? Can it coordinate a joint response? Can it enact this response swiftly and efficiently?

As Belgian officials admitted after a recent spate of drone sightings, the continent needs to “act faster” in building air-defence systems. Every such admission emboldens Moscow’s conviction that Europe is unprepared and divided.

Back home, these moments are curated into propaganda clips for state television, where pundits mock European “weakness” and frame the continent’s disarray as validation for the Kremlin’s confrontational stance. This manufactured crisis, in turn, is the latest application of a well-honed strategy.

With regard to the West, the aim is exhaustion, not conquest – a “permanent test” designed to drain resources and unity through constant, low-level pressure.

What comes next?

Russia’s escalating provocations of Nato and Europe cannot be maintained as status quo. As things stand, there are three possible scenarios for where they could lead us:

1. A new, long-term confrontation: This is the most likely outcome, as Nato cannot concede to Russia’s core demands without undermining its founding principles. Conflict would probably take the form of a drawn-out standoff: more troops on the alliance’s eastern flank, swelling defence budgets, and a new Iron Curtain across Europe.
2. The “Finlandisation” of Ukraine: One possible, though unstable, outcome could see Ukraine coerced into a neutral status – foreswearing Nato membership in exchange for guarantees as Finland did during the Cold War. From the West’s perspective, this would reward Moscow’s aggression, and entrench its veto over neighbours’ sovereignty.
3. Escalation through miscalculation: In a landscape of heightened tension, even a minor incident – a drone shootdown, a cyberattack gone wrong – could spiral into wider confrontation. A deliberate war between Nato and Russia is still improbable, but no longer unthinkable.

Europe’s imperative: resilience

The Kremlin’s approach relies on fragmentation; Europe’s answer must be cohesion. This means building up certain capabilities:

• Integrated air and missile defence: Build a truly continental shield, closing gaps that drones and hypersonic systems could exploit.
• Collective hybrid defence: Treat cyberattacks or drone incursions as alliance-wide challenges. A single, pre-agreed Nato response mechanism would deny Moscow the ability to isolate members.
• Technological and political autonomy: Invest in European defence industries, renewable energy independence, and resilient supply chains. Security now begins with self-sufficiency, especially in the face of wavering support from the US.
• Deterrence through diplomacy: Europe must combine credible military deterrence with pragmatic engagement, ensuring that channels of communication remain open to prevent escalation.

Russia’s strategy is not reactive, it is structural. The Kremlin seeks to force the West to accept a redrawn security order through a blend of coercion, probing, and perpetual testing. The tools may vary – from tanks to drones, from overt invasion to a hybrid war of attrition – but the aim endures: to undermine European unity and restore the sphere of influence lost by Russia in 1991.

Europe’s challenge is equally clear. It has to resist the fatigue of endless crisis and demonstrate that resilience, not fear, defines the continent’s future.

Moscow’s provocations will continue until the costs become prohibitive. Only a unified, prepared Europe can make that happen.

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Christo Atanasov Kostov, International Relations, Cold War, nationalism, Russian propaganda, IE University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Toby Murray, The University of Melbourne

Australians are once again being warned to tighten their online security and be extra alert to scammers, after up to 5.7 million Qantas customers’ personal details – including phone numbers and birthdays – were leaked to the dark web on Sunday.

Cyber crime supergroup Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters accessed the data back in June by convincing a Manila-based call centre operator to give the hackers access to their Salesforce system.

On Monday, federal Cyber Security Minister Tony Burke said: “You can’t simply outsource to other companies and think suddenly you’ve got no obligations on cyber security… There are very serious penalties.”

But what are those potential penalties for Qantas? And why is a corporate watchdog warning about even more serious data theft risks when Australian finance companies outsource their work overseas?

What penalties could Qantas face?

Law firm Maurice Blackburn has lodged a complaint over the Qantas data breach with Australia’s independent privacy regulator – the Office of the Information Commissioner – alleging the airline breached privacy laws by failing to adequately protect customer information.

When asked by the ABC, the commissioner’s office wouldn’t comment on whether Qantas would be fined over this latest breach.

So how much is the maximum fine for breaches like this?

Under the Privacy Act, serious or repeated privacy breaches can now incur fines of up to A$50 million or 30% of a company’s adjusted turnover during the period of the breach – whichever is greater.

This Qantas data breach is less serious than those that hit Optus and Medibank in 2022. For instance, hackers shared Medibank customers’ highly sensitive medical history data, and stole valuable identity document data, including credit card, passport and driver’s licence details. That matter is still before the courts.

While the Qantas data was still sensitive – including customers’ dates of birth, phone numbers, addresses, emails and frequent flyer numbers – it presents less of a risk for individual customers.

Besides penalties under the Privacy Act, Qantas also faces a potential class action, which affected Qantas customers can join.

Another potential outcome for Qantas could be a court-ordered payment scheme, in which individuals affected by the breach may be eventually entitled to compensation from Qantas.

We saw a similar arrangement for Facebook users affected by the Cambridge Analytica data breach a decade ago.

What are the rules for companies sharing your data overseas?

The Australian Privacy Act has specific provisions covering how companies handle your data when they send it overseas.

Importantly, when an Australian company gives your data to an offshore entity, the Australian company remains accountable for ensuring your data is kept safe.

This is why it’s important for Australian companies to consider carefully the potential risks of sending Australians’ data overseas.

These risks should be front of mind for Qantas, which in 2024 suffered a much smaller data breach due to alleged misbehaviour of overseas contractors.

However, these risks extend well beyond flagship companies such as Qantas.

Warnings over even more sensitive data

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) regulates Australian markets and financial services companies. Only days ago, it warned of “governance gaps” when financial services companies outsource work overseas – and potentially put Australians’ sensitive data at risk.

This year, ASIC has taken separate court action against Fortnum Private Wealth and FIIG Securities, alleging they failed to manage cybersecurity risks affecting thousands of customers.

In FIIG’s case, ASIC alleges a hacker was able to steal sensitive data including passport, bank account and tax file numbers. Those court cases are yet to be heard.

The finance sector – including banks, financial advisors and superannuation funds – consistently reports the third highest number of data breaches, after the health sector and government.

What we all need to do next

As individuals, we have relatively little control over how Australian companies handle our data, let alone the overseas companies they work with. But we can all do more to make ourselves more secure.

Be on scam watch: given how many Australians were exposed in the Qantas breach, be on the lookout now for scammers.

History suggests scammers target data breach victims, or people who think they may have been impacted by a data breach. If you receive a message you suspect is a scam, don’t respond – report it to Scamwatch.

Practise good “cyber hygiene”: avoid using the same password on multiple websites. Instead, use a password manager that saves your passwords across your computer and mobile phone.

That way, if your data is breached at Company A, it has less chance of impacting your security with Company B.

Companies need to step up too: Australian company executives would do well to ensure their governance, risk and compliance practices are up to scratch, especially on how they manage third-party risks.

As consumers, we entrust our cyber security to all of the companies with whom we interact. Those companies, in turn, owe it to us to ensure the drive to maximise profits doesn’t come at the cost of leaving customers worse off.

Toby Murray, Professor of Cybersecurity, School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

US President Donald Trump will visit Israel and Egypt this week to oversee the initial implementation of his Gaza peace agreement, which many hope will permanently end the two-year war in the strip.

Should the peace hold, the Gaza accord will be Trump’s greatest foreign policy achievement, even surpassing the Abraham Accords of his first term that normalised relations between Israel and several Arab countries.

Given the speed with which the Trump administration has helped to negotiate the ceasefire, it is an opportune moment to assess Trump’s frenetic foreign policy at the start of his second presidential term.

The “Trump Doctrine” – the unconventional, high-energy and fast-moving approach to world affairs now pursued by the United States – has had some significant achievements, most notably in Gaza. But are these breakthroughs sustainable, and can his foreign policy approach be effective with larger geostrategic challenges?

A leaner decision-making structure

One way the Trump administration’s approach is different from previous administrations – including Trump 1.0 – is in his leaner organisation, which is more capable of implementing quick action.

Trump has revamped the national security decision-making structure in surprising ways. His secretary of state, Marco Rubio, now serves concurrently as his national security adviser. Rubio has also reduced the staff of the National Security Council from around 350 to about 150, which is still larger than many of Trump’s predecessors before Barack Obama.

There have been some missteps. Trump’s first national security adviser, Michael Waltz, tried to accommodate his need for speedy decision-making by establishing group chats on the Signal app for the small group of agency heads and senior advisers who advise Trump. This rightfully caused concerns about the security of classified information – especially after Waltz mistakenly added a journalist to a chat group – and he was subsequently ousted.

With a much smaller staff now, Rubio is implementing a more sustainable method for the president to communicate with his top advisers, mostly through Rubio himself and Trump’s powerful chief of staff, Susie Wiles.

Rubio has also led a top-down revamp of the bureaucratic foreign policy structures. Dozens of offices were eliminated, and hundreds of career professionals were laid off. Numerous political appointments, including ambassadorships, remain unfilled.

Many bureaus are now headed not by Senate-confirmed assistant secretaries, but by career foreign and civil service “senior bureau officials”. This keeps the number of politically appointed policymakers rather small – mostly in Rubio’s direct orbit – while keeping professional “implementers” in key positions to execute policy.

A reliance on special envoys

To set the stage for his own deal-making, Trump also uses his longtime friend and multipurpose envoy, Steve Witkoff, for the highest-level conversations. Without any Senate confirmation, Witkoff has become Trump’s most trusted voice in Ukraine, Gaza and several other foreign policy negotiations.

Massad Boulos, another unconfirmed Trump envoy, conducts second-tier negotiations, mostly in Africa but also parts of the Middle East.

Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, played a key role in the recent Gaza accord as well. This has raised questions of conflicts of interest. However, Trump’s emphasis on deal-oriented businessmen in diplomatic roles is intentional.

The approach appears to be very welcome in some quarters, particularly in the Middle East, where conventional diplomacy was fraught with much historical baggage.

A ‘shock and awe’ approach

On top of all this, of course, is Trump’s style and showmanship.

His most controversial statements – for example, demanding US ownership of Greenland – may seem absurd and offensive at first. However, there are genuine national security concerns over China’s role in the Arctic and the possibility an independent Greenland might serve as a wedge in a critical region. From this standpoint, establishing some US control over Greenland’s foreign policy is an entirely rational proposition.

What is unique to Trump is the pace, breadth and intensity of his personal diplomacy.

Trump’s relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is a case in point. While Trump embraces Netanyahu in public and green-lights all of Israel’s military actions, he’s willing to say no to the Israeli leader in private. For example, Trump intervened to prevent Israel from annexing the West Bank immediately before the Gaza breakthrough.

In addition, Trump’s personal charm offensive with Arab leaders in the region – his first major foreign trip after Pope Francis’ funeral was to Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – established a coalition to pressure Hamas to say yes to the deal.

It is a “shock and awe” diplomatic approach: everything, everywhere, all at once. Previous agreements and norms (including those set by Trump himself) are downplayed or discarded in favour of action in the moment.

Is there a longer-term vision?

Of course, there are downsides to the Trump approach. The past cannot be ignored, especially in the Middle East. And many previous agreements and norms were there for a reason – they worked, and they helped stabilise otherwise chaotic situations.
It very much remains to be seen whether Trump’s approach can lead to a long-term solution in Gaza. Many critics have pointed out the vagueness in his 20-point peace plan, which could cause it to fall apart at any moment.

It is not unusual for a second-term American president like Trump to focus on foreign policy, where Congress has a highly limited role and the president has wide latitude. But American presidents usually focus on achieving one big thing. Think Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran or George W. Bush’s troop surge in Iraq.

Today, in addition to the Gaza accord, Trump is pursuing separate diplomatic deals with all four major American adversaries: China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.

The logic of this is to put direct stress on the alliance of bad actors. Does Chinese leader Xi Jinping trust Russian President Vladimir Putin enough to resist Trump’s entreaties, and vice versa? How much are Russia and China worried about North Korean leader Kim Jong Un cutting a deal with Washington?

The true test of the Trump Doctrine will not be the success of the Gaza accord, but whether he can build on it to drive the West’s adversaries – mainly China and Russia – apart from each other and into weaker strategic positions.

Lester Munson, Non-Resident Fellow, United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.