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Trump heads to the Gulf aiming to bolster trade ties

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Trump heads to the Gulf aiming to bolster trade ties – but side talks on Tehran, Gaza could drive a wedge between US and Israel

President Donald Trump and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman attend the G20 Summit in Japan in 2019.
Eliot Blondet/AFP via Getty Images

Asher Kaufman, University of Notre Dame

President Donald Trump will sit down with the Saudi crown prince and Emirati and Qatari leaders on May 14, 2025, in what is being heavily touted as a high-stakes summit. Not invited, and watching warily, will be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Like many other members of his right-wing coalition, Netanyahu appeared delighted at the election of Trump as U.S. president in November, believing that the Republican’s Middle East policies would undoubtedly favor Israeli interests and be coordinated closely with Netanyahu himself.

But it hasn’t quite played out that way. Of course, Washington remains – certainly in official communications – Israel’s strongest global ally and chief supplier of arms. But Trump is promoting a Middle East policy that is, at times, distinctly at odds with the interests of Netanyahu and his government.

In fact, in pushing for an Iran nuclear deal – a surprise reversal from Trump’s first administration – Trump is undermining long-held Netanyahu positions. Such is the level of alarm in Israeli right-wing circles that rumors have been circulating of Trump announcing unilateral U.S. support for a Palestinian state ahead of the Riyadh visit – something that would represent a clear departure for Washington.

As a historian of Israel and the broader Middle East, I recognize that in key ways Trump’s agenda in Riyadh represents a continuation of the U.S. policies, notably in pursuing security relationships with Arab Gulf monarchies – something Israel has long accepted if not openly supported. But in the process, the trip could also put significant daylight between Trump and Netanyahu.

Trump’s official agenda

The four-day trip to the Gulf, Trump’s first policy-driven foreign visit since being elected president, is on the surface more about developing economic and security ties between the U.S. and traditional allies in the Persian Gulf.

Trump is expected to cement trade deals worth tens of billions of dollars between the U.S. and Arab Gulf States, including unprecedented arms purchases, Gulf investments in the U.S. and even the floated Qatari gift of a palatial 747 intended for use as Air Force One.

There is also the possibility of a security alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

So far, so good for Israel’s government. Prior to the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel was already in the process of forging closer ties to the Gulf states, with deals and diplomatic relations established with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain through the Abraham Accords that the Trump administration itself facilitated in September 2020. A potential normalization of ties with Saudi Arabia was also in the offing.

Dealing with Tehran

But central to the agenda this week in Riyadh will be issues where Trump and Netanyahu are increasingly not on the same page. And that starts with Iran.

While the country won’t be represented, Iran will feature heavily at Trump’s summit, as it coincides with the U.S. administration’s ongoing diplomatic talks with Tehran over its nuclear program. Those negotiations have now concluded four rounds. And despite clear challenges, American and Iranian delegations continue to project optimism about the possibility of reaching a deal.

The approach marks a change of course for Trump, who in 2018 abandoned a similar deal to the one he is now largely looking to forge. It also suggests the U.S. is currently opposed to the idea of direct armed confrontation with Iran, against Netanayhu’s clear preference.

Diplomacy with Tehran is also favored by Gulf states as a way of containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Even Saudi Arabia – Tehran’s long-term regional rival that, like Israel, opposed the Obama-era Iran nuclear diplomacy – is increasingly looking for a more cautious engagement with Iran. In April, the Saudi defense minister visited Tehran ahead of the recent U.S.-Iranian negotiations.

Netanyahu has built his political career on the looming threat from a nuclearized Iran and the necessity to nip this threat in the bud. He unsuccessfully tried to undermine President Barack Obama’s initial efforts to reach an agreement with Iran – resulting in 2015’s Iran nuclear deal. But Netanyahu had more luck with Obama’s successor, helping convince Trump to withdraw from the agreement in 2018.

So Trump’s about-turn on Iran talks has irked Netanyahu – not only because it happened, but because it happened so publicly. In April, the U.S. president called Netanyahu to the White House and openly embarrassed him by stating that Washington is pursuing diplomatic negotiations with Tehran.

Split over Yemen

A clear indication of the potential tension between the Trump administration and the Israeli government can be seen in the ongoing skirmishes involving the U.S., Israel and the Houthis in Yemen.

After the Houthis fired a missile at the Tel Aviv airport on May 4 – leading to its closure and the cancellation of multiple international flights – Israel struck back, devastating an airport and other facilities in Yemen’s capital.

But just a few hours after the Israeli attack, Trump announced that the U.S. would not strike the Houthis anymore, as they had “surrendered” to his demands and agreed not to block passage of U.S. ships in the Red Sea.

It became clear that Israel was not involved in this new understanding between the U.S. and the Houthis. Trump’s statement was also notable in its timing, and could be taken as an effort to calm the region in preparation of his trip to Saudi Arabia. The fact that it might help smooth talks with Iran too – Tehran being the Houthis’ main sponsor – was likely a factor as well.

Timing is also relevant in Israel’s latest attack on Yemeni ports. They took place on May 11 – the eve of Trump setting off for his visit to Saudi Arabia. In so doing, Netanyahu may be sending a signal not only to the Houthis but also to the U.S. and Iran. Continuing to attack the Houthis might make nuclear talks more difficult.

Bibi’s political survival-first approach

Critical observers of Netanyahu have long argued that he prioritizes continued war in Gaza over regional calm for the sake of holding together his far-right coalition, members of which desire full control of the Gaza Strip and de-facto annexation of the West Bank.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warns of the Iran nuclear threat at the United Nations in 2012.
Mario Tama/Getty Images

This, many political commentators have argued, is the main reason why Netanyahu backed off from the last stage of the ceasefire agreement with Hamas in March – something which would have required the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Gaza Strip.

Since the collapse of the ceasefire, Israel’s army has mobilized in preparation for a renewed Gaza assault, scheduled to start after the end of Trump’s trip to the Gulf.

With members of the Netanayhu government openly supporting the permanent occupation of the strip and declaring that bringing back the remaining Israeli hostages is no longer a top priority, it seems clear to me that deescalation is not on Netanyahu’s agenda.

Trump himself has noted recently both the alarming state of the hostages and the grave humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Now, in addition to the release of Israeli-American hostage Edan Alexander, the U.S. is also engaged in negotiations with Hamas over ceasefire and aid – ignoring Netanyahu in the process.

The bottom dollar

Current U.S. policy in the region may all be serving a greater aim for Trump: to secure billions of dollars of Gulf money for the American economy and, some have said, himself. But to achieve that requires a stable Middle East, and continued war in Gaza and Iran inching closer to nuclear capabilities might disrupt that goal.

Of course, a diplomatic agreement over Tehran’s nuclear plans is still some way off. And Trump’s foreign policy is notably prone to abrupt turns. But whether guided by a dealmaker’s instincts to pursue trade and economic deals with wealthy Gulf states, or by a genuine – and related – desire to stabilize the region, his administration is increasingly pursuing policies that go against the interests of the current Israeli government.

Asher Kaufman, Professor of History and Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Cut emissions 70% by 2035? There’s only one policy that can get us there

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Rod Sims, The University of Melbourne

Australia’s new emission reduction target of 62–70% by 2035 is meant to demonstrate we are doing our part to hold climate change well below 2°C.

The new target can just about do this if we hit the upper end of the range.

To get there, Climate Change and Energy Minister Chris Bowen today outlined new funding to help industry go clean and boost clean energy financing and clean fuels.

On top of our existing policies, these don’t look to be enough to trigger the step change needed. But there is a deeper problem. At present, the government’s approach is one of command and control. Canberra is deciding what goes ahead and what doesn’t. This approach is not only inefficient but has a very real limit – how far the public purse will stretch.

Far and away the best option to rapidly cut emissions is to once again price carbon. When it costs money to emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, markets start shifting huge amounts of money into clean alternatives. The funds raised can help strengthen the budget – and compensate consumers, who are currently not being compensated for current policy costs.

The question now is whether the government can shake off their memory of the political turmoil around the introduction of the last carbon price introduced in 2012 – especially given this turmoil had much to do with constant leadership changes.

Is this range the “sweet spot”?

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described the long-anticipated 2035 target range as a “sweet spot”, while Minister Bowen said anything more ambitious than 70% was not achievable.

While this focus on achievability is commendable, it’s also unfortunately true that Australia’s remaining carbon budget is shrinking rapidly.

Globally, this budget represents the emissions that can still be emitted with a good chance of keeping warming under 2°C. Australia’s share is about 10 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent between 2013 and 2050, when we have pledged to hit net zero.

At present, our emissions are about 440 million tonnes a year, which would mean using up our budget by 2036 – well short of 2050. So we must accelerate emission reduction.

Some experts argue a lower target than just announced is appropriate, given policies aren’t in place to achieve more. But this is self-defeating – the focus must be on having the appropriate policies.

aerial view of solar farm.
Renewables have ramped up quickly. But much more clean energy will be needed to meet emissions targets.
Abstract Aerial Art/Getty

Reaching this target requires better policies

Australia’s current suite of policies are leading to slow declines in emissions.

Unfortunately, the government’s new and existing policies don’t seem up to the task of meeting the 43% by 2030 target, let alone the new 62–70% cuts five years later.

To date, the government has heavily relied on two policies to bring emissions down. Both have flaws.

The first is the Capacity Investment Scheme, which underwrites renewable energy generation and storage projects. In the absence of a carbon price, the government needs to underwrite projects as there is no green premium to create incentives for market-led investment. The government, not the market, is deciding which clean energy projects proceed.

Underwriting new projects comes with a large contingent liability, as the Commonwealth budget is partly underwriting these projects. The scheme is proceeding more slowly than the government hoped.

The second is the Safeguard Mechanism, which requires major industrial emitters to progressively lower their emissions. The scheme covers less than 30% of the economy and applies to emissions intensity rather than overall emissions, meaning higher production can lead to higher emissions.

Today, the government announced A$5 billion to support large industrial facilities to make major investments in decarbonisation and energy efficiency, $1 billion for a clean fuel fund, $2 billion to accelerate renewable project rollout and additional funding for household decarbonisation and kerbside EV charging. As it stands, these don’t seem sufficient.

Outside the land use sector, Australia’s emissions have remained broadly flat since 2005. They haven’t risen sharply, but they have not declined. If the government restricts itself to small adjustments to existing policies, this is unlikely to change.

a high view of an open cut coal mine, with piles of coal and roads visible.
A carbon price would give markets a clear incentive to switch from high emitting sources of power to low.
mikulas1/Getty

Time to look at a carbon price

It would be far simpler to reintroduce a carbon price.

For two years from June 2012, Australia had a carbon price. It worked. Markets funded lower-emission power sources over higher-emission ones. But the scheme became politically fraught and was repealed. Since then, pricing carbon has been seen as politically unviable.

This paralysis is unfortunate. We need to judge what is politically possible today, not what happened a decade ago. Notably, in 2021, the Morrison Coalition government released modelling showing a carbon price would be necessary to reach net zero.

With a carbon price off the table, the government is left with expensive and slow policies. Worse, it faces significant political risks if it fails to meet its own targets while increasing costs to consumers – without the revenue a carbon price could provide as compensation.

Much of the debate over carbon pricing is between supporters of climate action and those who oppose any action to reduce emissions. Those wanting climate action have been forced to fight on weaker ground defending inefficient measures. It’s counterproductive not to use the most efficient mechanism to reduce emissions.

Unlock the private sector – by pricing carbon

To make real headway towards cutting emissions, Australia needs to energise the private sector.

Here, too, the best way is to price carbon. This would mean fossil fuel producers and users would have to pay for the damage their products do. Without this incentive to reduce emissions, companies will not take action.

The fault lies with government. Having identified greenhouse emissions as a major and growing problem, successive governments have refused to take the obvious step to fix it: make pollution cost money.

In 2025, it’s very unlikely any private investor will build new fossil fuel generation, other than gas peaking plants to firm renewables. No investor will build extremely expensive and slow nuclear plants.

That means the electricity grid can only meet rising demand – particularly from the enormous growth in data centres – if we add much more renewable energy, firmed by storage or gas.

Over time, the budget would improve from the proceeds of the carbon price, and productivity would grow as Australia’s expensive and somewhat arbitrary methods of cutting emissions would no longer be needed.

A carbon price is needed now to underpin our electricity market, and so our economy, improve our budget position and productivity – and to meet or surpass new emission reduction targets.

2035 is just ten years away. If the government prices carbon, Australia could achieve very rapid reductions – potentially as high as 75%.The Conversation

Rod Sims, Enterprise Professor, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Albanese leaves PNG with major defence treaty still a work in progress

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Michelle Grattan, University of Canberra

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese put the best face on the situation after his plan to sign a major defence treaty with Papua New Guinea while in Port Moresby fell through.

Albanese said he expected the signing of the treaty – of which the wording was approved – to be finalised “in coming weeks”.

The government hopes the coming regular annual ministerial meeting between the two countries, on a date to be fixed, would provide the opportunity to finally land the treaty. Australia is hosting the meeting this year.

Instead of the treaty signing, Albanese and PNG Prime Minister James Marape issued a joint communique saying the two countries had agreed on a text of a Mutual Defence Treaty “which will be signed following Cabinet processes in both countries”.

The treaty would “elevate the defence relationship between Papua New Guinea and Austrlia. to an Alliance”, it said.

This is the second time within weeks Albanese’s plans for finalising a treaty with a regional country have been dashed. Last week he was unable to land a $500 million agreement with Vanuatu.

Albanese has been in PNG this week for the 50th anniversary of the country’s independence. Earlier in the week, he said the signing had been delayed because a PNG cabinet quorum could not be summoned after cabinet members had returned to their home areas for the celebrations.

Albanese told a joint Wednesday news conference with Marape: “We respect the processes of the Papua New Guinea government. What this is about is the processes of their cabinet.”

Both leaders made the point that the treaty had been sought by PNG.

Asked whether the signing delay could open a window for China to try to scuttle the deal, Marape said there was “no way, shape or form” that China could have any hand in telling PNG not to have the treaty.

While it had been a friend of PNG for the last 50 years, China knew that PNG had “security partners of choice,” Marape said.

But he said that in the next couple of days he would send the PNG defence minister first to China and then to other countries, including the United States, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines “to inform them all exactly what this is all about”.

The joint communique said the proposed Pukpuk treaty would include “a mutual defence Alliance which recognises that an armed attack on Australia or Papua New Guinea would be a danger to the peace and security of both countries”.

In other provisions the treaty also covers the recruitment of PNG citizens into the Australian Defence Force.

It would also ensure “any activities, agreements or arrangements with third parties would not compromise the ability” of PNG or Australia to implement the treaty.

Albanese said the treaty would “be Australia’s first new alliance in more than 70 years and only the third in our entire history, along with the ANZUS treaty with New Zealand and the United States”.The Conversation

Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Charlie Kirk shooting suspect had ties to gaming culture and the ‘dark internet’

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Matthew Sharpe, Australian Catholic University

Tyler Robinson, the 22-year-old Utah man suspected of having fatally shot right-wing activist Charlie Kirk, is reportedly not cooperating with authorities.

Robinson was apprehended after a more than two-day manhunt and is being held without bail at the Utah County Jail.

While a motive for the shooting has yet to be established, Utah Governor Spencer Cox has highlighted Robinson’s links to gaming and the “dark internet”.

Bullet casings found at the scene were inscribed with various messages evoking gaming subcultures. One of the quotes – “Notices bulges, OwO what’s this” – can be linked to the furry community, known for role-playing using animal avatars.

Another message – “Hey, fascist! Catch! ↑ → ↓↓↓” – features arrow symbols associated with an action that allows players to drop bombs on their foes in Helldiver 2, a game in which players play as fascists fighting enemy forces.

One casing reads “O Bella ciao, Bella ciao, Bella ciao, Ciao, ciao!”, words from an Italian anti-Mussolini protest song, which also appears in the shooter game Far Cry 6. Yet another is a homophobic jibe: “if you read this you are gay LMAO”.

If Robinson does turn out to be a shooter radicalised through online gaming spaces, he would not be the first. Previous terrorist shootings at Christchurch (New Zealand), Halle (Germany), Bærum (Norway), and the US cities of Buffalo, El Paso and Poway were all carried out by radicalised young men who embraced online conspiracies and violent video games.

In each of these cases, the shooter attempted (and in all but the Poway shooting, succeeded) to live stream the atrocities, as though emulating a first-person shooter game.

A growing online threat

The global video game market is enormous, with an estimated value of almost US$300 billion (about A$450 billion) in 2024. Of the more than three billion gamers, the largest percentage is made up of young adults aged 18–34.

Many of these are vulnerable young men. And extremist activists have long recognised this group as a demographic ripe for radicalisation.

As early as 2002, American neo-Nazi leader Matt Hale advised his followers “if we can influence video games and entertainment, it will make people understand we are their friends and neighbours”.

Since then, far-right groups have produced ethnonationalist-themed games, such as “Ethnic Cleansing” and “ZOG’s Nightmare”, in which players defend the “white race” against Islamists, immigrants, LGBTQIA+ people, Jews and more.

Studying radicalisation in gamer circles

For many, the Kirk shooting has resurfaced the perennial question about the link (or lack thereof) between playing violent video games and real-world violence.

But while this is an important line of inquiry, the evidence suggests most radicalisation takes place not through playing video games themselves, but through gaming platform communication channels.

In 2020, my colleagues and I studied an extraordinary data dump of more than nine million posts from the gaming platform Steam to understand this process.

We found evidence of radicalisation occurring through communication channels, such as team voice channels. Here, players establish connections with one another, and can leverage these connections for political recruitment.

The radicalisation of vulnerable users is not instantaneous. Once extremists have connected with potential targets, they invite them into platforms such as Discord or private chat rooms. These spaces allow for meme and image sharing, as well as ongoing voice and video conversations.

Skilful recruiters will play to a target’s specific grievances. These may be personal, psycho-sexual (such as being unable to gain love or approval), or related to divisive issues such as employment, housing or gender roles.

The recruit is initiated into a fast-changing set of cynical in-jokes and in-group terms. These may include mocking self-designations, such as the Pepe the Frog meme, used by the far-right to ironically embrace their ugly “political incorrectness”. They also use derogatory terms for “enemies”, such as “woke”, “social justice warriors”, “soyboys”, “fascists” and “cultural Marxists”.

Gradually, the new recruit becomes accustomed to the casual denigration and dehumanisation of the “enemies”.

Dark and sarcastic humour allow for plausible deniability while still spreading hate. As such, humour acts an on-ramp to slowly introduce new recruits to the conspiratorial and violent ideologies that lie at the heart of terrorist shootings.

Generally, these ideologies claim the world is run by nefarious and super-powerful plutocrats/Jews/liberals/communists/elites, who can only be stopped through extreme measures.

It then becomes a question of resolve. Who among the group is willing to do what the ideology suggests is necessary?

What can be done?

The Australian Federal Police, as well as the Australian parliament, has recognised the threat of violence as a result of radicalisation through online gaming. Clearly, it’s something we can’t be complacent about.

Social isolation and mental illness, which are sadly as widespread in Australia as they are elsewhere, are some of the factors online extremists try to exploit when luring vulnerable individuals.

At the same time, social media algorithms function to shunt users into ever more sensational content. This is something online extremists have benefited from, and learned to exploit.

There is a growing number of organisations devoted to trying to prevent online radicalisation through gaming platforms. Many of these have resources for concerned parents, teachers and care givers.

Ultimately, in an increasingly online world, the best way to keep young people safe from online radicalisation is to keep having constructive offline conversations about their virtual experiences, and the people they might meet in the process.The Conversation

Matthew Sharpe, Associate Professor in Philosophy, Australian Catholic University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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