Connect with us
https://tickernews.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/AmEx-Thought-Leaders.jpg

Ticker Views

Iran’s long history of revolution, defiance and outside interference

Published

on

Iran’s long history of revolution, defiance and outside interference – and why its future is so uncertain

Amin Saikal, Victoria University

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has gone beyond his initial aim of destroying Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons. He has called on the Iranian people to rise up against their dictatorial Islamic regime and ostensibly transform Iran along the lines of Israeli interests.

United States President Donald Trump is now weighing possible military action in support of Netanyahu’s goal and asked for Iran’s total surrender.

If the US does get involved, it wouldn’t be the first time it’s tried to instigate regime change by military means in the Middle East. The US invaded Iraq in 2003 and backed a NATO operation in Libya in 2011, toppling the regimes of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, respectively.

In both cases, the interventions backfired, causing long-term instability in both countries and in the broader region.

Could the same thing happen in Iran if the regime is overthrown?

As I describe in my book, Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic, Iran is a pluralist society with a complex history of rival groups trying to assert their authority. A democratic transition would be difficult to achieve.

The overthrow of the shah

The Iranian Islamic regime assumed power in the wake of the pro-democracy popular uprising of 1978–79, which toppled Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s pro-Western monarchy.

Until this moment, Iran had a long history of monarchical rule dating back 2,500 years. Mohammad Reza, the last shah, was the head of the Pahlavi dynasty, which came to power in 1925.

In 1953, the shah was forced into exile under the radical nationalist and reformist impulse of the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. He was shortly returned to his throne through a CIA-orchestrated coup.

Despite all his nationalist, pro-Western, modernising efforts, the shah could not shake off the indignity of having been re-throned with the help of a foreign power.

The revolution against him 25 years later was spearheaded by pro-democracy elements. But it was made up of many groups, including liberalists, communists and Islamists, with no uniting leader.

The Shia clerical group (ruhaniyat), led by the Shah’s religious and political opponent, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, proved to be best organised and capable of providing leadership to the revolution. Khomeini had been in exile from the early 1960s (at first in Iraq and later in France), yet he and his followers held considerable sway over the population, especially in traditional rural areas.

When US President Jimmy Carter’s administration found it could no longer support the shah, he left the country and went into exile in January 1979. This enabled Khomeini to return to Iran to a tumultuous welcome.

Birth of the Islamic Republic

In the wake of the uprising, Khomeini and his supporters, including the current supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, abolished the monarchy and transformed Iran to a cleric-dominated Islamic Republic, with anti-US and anti-Israel postures. He ruled the country according to his unique vision of Islam.

Khomeini denounced the US as a “Great Satan” and Israel as an illegal usurper of the Palestinian lands – Jerusalem, in particular. He also declared a foreign policy of “neither east, nor west” but pro-Islamic, and called for the spread of the Iranian revolution in the region.

Khomeini not only changed Iran, but also challenged the US as the dominant force in shaping the regional order. And the US lost one of the most important pillars of its influence in the oil-rich and strategically important Persian Gulf region.

Fear of hostile American or Israeli (or combined) actions against the Islamic Republic became the focus of Iran’s domestic and foreign policy behaviour.

A new supreme leader takes power

Khomeini died in 1989. His successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has ruled Iran largely in the same jihadi (combative) and ijtihadi (pragmatic) ways, steering the country through many domestic and foreign policy challenges.

Khamenei fortified the regime with an emphasis on self-sufficiency, a stronger defence capability and a tilt towards the east – Russia and China – to counter the US and its allies. He has stood firm in opposition to the US and its allies – Israel, in particular. And he has shown flexibility when necessary to ensure the survival and continuity of the regime.

Khamenei wields enormous constitutional power and spiritual authority.

He has presided over the building of many rule-enforcing instruments of state power, including the expansion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its paramilitary wing, the Basij, revolutionary committees, and Shia religious networks.

The Shia concept of martyrdom and loyalty to Iran as a continuous sovereign country for centuries goes to the heart of his actions, as well as his followers.

Khamenei and his rule enforcers, along with an elected president and National Assembly, are fully cognisant that if the regime goes down, they will face the same fate. As such, they cannot be expected to hoist the white flag and surrender to Israel and the US easily.

However, in the event of the regime falling under the weight of a combined internal uprising and external pressure, it raises the question: what is the alternative?

The return of the shah?

Many Iranians are discontented with the regime, but there is no organised opposition under a nationally unifying leader.

The son of the former shah, the crown prince Reza Pahlavi, has been gaining some popularity. He has been speaking out on X in the last few days, telling his fellow Iranians:

The end of the Islamic Republic is the end of its 46-year war against the Iranian nation. The regime’s apparatus of repression is falling apart. All it takes now is a nationwide uprising to put an end to this nightmare once and for all.

Since the deposition of his father, he has lived in exile in the US. As such, he has been tainted by his close association with Washington and Jerusalem, especially Netanyahu.

If he were to return to power – likely through the assistance of the US – he would face the same problem of political legitimacy as his father did.

What does the future hold?

Iran has never had a long tradition of democracy. It experienced brief instances of liberalism in the first half of the 20th century, but every attempt at making it durable resulted in disarray and a return to authoritarian rule.

Also, the country has rarely been free of outside interventionism, given its vast hydrocarbon riches and strategic location. It’s also been prone to internal fragmentation, given its ethnic and religious mix.

The Shia Persians make up more than half of the population, but the country has a number of Sunni ethnic minorities, such as Kurds, Azaris, Balochis and Arabs. They have all had separatist tendencies.

Iran has historically been held together by centralisation rather than diffusion of power.

Should the Islamic regime disintegrate in one form or another, it would be an mistake to expect a smooth transfer of power or transition to democratisation within a unified national framework.

At the same time, the Iranian people are highly cultured and creative, with a very rich and proud history of achievements and civilisation.

They are perfectly capable of charting their own destiny as long as there aren’t self-seeking foreign hands in the process – something they have rarely experienced.

Amin Saikal, Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies, Australian National University; and Vice Chancellor’s Strategic Fellow, Victoria University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Ticker Views

Erin Patterson has been found guilty in the mushroom murder trial. Legal experts explain why

Published

on

Erin Patterson has been found guilty in the mushroom murder trial. Legal experts explain why

Rick Sarre, University of South Australia and Ben Livings, University of South Australia

After seven weeks of evidence, six days of summing up, and six and a half days of jury deliberation in the Victorian Supreme Court sitting in Morwell, Victoria, the verdict is finally in. Erin Patterson murdered her estranged husband’s parents, Don and Gail Patterson, along with Gail’s sister, Heather Wilkinson.

She was also found guilty of attempting to murder Heather’s husband Ian: the only guest to survive the beef wellington lunch served in July 2023 at her home in Leongatha.

In delivering the guilty verdict, the jury was satisfied Erin Patterson had complete control over the ingredients that went into the meal portions served to her guests – portions that included death cap mushrooms.

There would not be too many observers surprised with the outcome, given the strength of the prosecution case presented by Nanette Rogers.

There were no procedural surprises in this case. The prosecution presented its case, followed by the defence and ultimately, a jury verdict.

But this much-publicised case raises a number of legal issues that contributed to the length of the trial and its outcome. Let’s unpack them.

Motive doesn’t matter

The first is the question of motive. Defence counsel Colin Mandy made much of his assertion that there was no apparent reason for the accused to kill her guests.

It is, however, a mistake to think there needs to be a motive in order to convict. In cases of murder and attempted murder, all that’s required is for a jury to find a “culpable state of mind”.

In the case of the three deceased, the jury needed to be satisfied, beyond any reasonable doubt, that there was an intention to kill, or to do serious bodily harm.

In other words, it did not matter why Patterson killed her victims, only that she intended to do so, or to inflict serious harm with death resulting. In the case of the surviving guest, the jury was satisfied that there had been an intention to kill.

Establishing a motive is a useful tool that prosecution counsel may deploy to add fuel to the fire in the courtroom, but it was not necessary for Rogers to locate a motive in order for the jury to reach guilty verdicts.

Circumstantial, but substantial

Another oft-repeated fallacy is that guilty verdicts require more than “mere” circumstantial evidence.

In fact, most evidence in criminal cases is circumstantial, because direct evidence (such as an eyewitness or a visual or voice recording) is usually unavailable.

The circumstantial evidence in this case, according to the prosecution, included the attempted hiding of a tainted dehydrator, the doubt cast over whether an Asian grocer was the source of the poisonous mushrooms, and the fact that Erin Patterson’s meal portion was free of the deadly ingredient.

Placed together, this circumstantial evidence was strong enough for the 12 men and women to return guilty verdicts.

Indeed, taking into consideration the strength of this evidence, it is perhaps surprising that Patterson did not plead guilty to murder, given the discount on sentence she may have received. She chose to take her chances with a jury. Ultimately, she failed.

Days of summing up

Another interesting aspect of the case is that the summing up by the two lead barristers, and then the judge, took more than six days. A generation ago, these addresses would have typically taken considerably less time than that.

The change, which has occurred slowly over the last two decades, has been necessitated by appeal judgements following guilty verdicts in long trials. In some of these, defence counsel successfully argued the defence case was not sufficiently covered in the judge’s summing up.

That being the case, the prosecution summary now needs to preempt every aspect of the defence case, knowing the defence counsel summary that follows will attend to every last point that the prosecution has raised.

Then the judge needs to give chapter and verse (in this case, over four days) in relation to everything again, paying particular attention to the defence case.

The process is now laborious and time-consuming. One might pity the jurors hearing everything over and over again.

Indeed, we believe there is little evidence this very expensive change has raised the quality of verdicts.

But one cannot doubt the way that the criminal process now goes to extraordinary lengths to ensure that an accused receives a fair trial. We will never know why the jury took over six days to reach its verdict (in Australia they are duty bound not to reveal anything of their deliberations), but it does indicate the seriousness with which they treat their role in this process.

The trust that is placed in the hands of jurors, even with the high profile media frenzy that this case elicited, remains firm.

On the other hand, with such drawn-out procedures, it’s perhaps not surprising that court backlogs continue to grow, and ever-increasing numbers of people (currently 42% of the Australian prison population) are sitting in prison on remand, awaiting trial.

What now?

The maximum sentence for murder in Victoria is life imprisonment. This does not necessarily mean life in prison, for the minimum non-parole period is 30 years, unless a court considers it not in the interests of justice to set such a term.

Erin Patterson will likely receive a life sentence, with a non-parole period that is in keeping with the number of victims.

The head sentence and non-parole period will be set by Justice Christopher Beale after sentencing submissions in the days and weeks to come.

The so-called “mushroom case” still has another chapter to run.

Rick Sarre, Emeritus Professor in Law and Criminal Justice, University of South Australia and Ben Livings, Associate Professor in Criminal Law and Evidence, University of South Australia

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Ticker Views

A new Gaza ceasefire deal is on the table – will this time be different?

Published

on

A new Gaza ceasefire deal is on the table – will this time be different?

Julie M. Norman, UCL

The US president, Donald Trump, says that Israel has agreed to terms for a 60-day ceasefire in Gaza. If that sounds familiar, it is.

The idea of a two-month truce has been discussed since the collapse of the last shortlived ceasefire in March. A similar proposal was floated in May, but Hamas viewed it as an enabling mechanism for Israel to continue the war after a brief pause, rather than reaching a permanent peace deal.

As the devastation in Gaza worsens by the day, will this time be any different?

The proposal, put forward by Qatari mediators, reportedly involves Hamas releasing ten living hostages and the bodies of 18 deceased hostages over the 60-day period, in exchange for the release of a number of Palestinian prisoners.


Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


The remaining 22 hostages would be released if a long-term deal is reached. The 60-day ceasefire period would also involve negotiations for a permanent end to hostilities and a roadmap for post-war governance in Gaza.

But the plan is similar to the eight-week, three-phase ceasefire from January to March of this year, which collapsed after the first phase of hostage exchanges. Since then peace talks have hit a recurrent impasse.

For Hamas, a long-term ceasefire means the permanent end to the war and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. Israel, meanwhile, wants to see the complete removal of Hamas from power, the dismantling and disarming of its military wing and the exile of remaining senior Hamas leaders.

But despite the persistent challenges, there are several reasons that this attempt for a ceasefire might be different. First and foremost is the recent so-called “12-day war” between Israel and Iran, which Israel has trumpeted as a major success for degrading Iran’s nuclear capabilities (although the reality is more nuanced).

The perceived win gives Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, political maneuverability to pursue a ceasefire over the objections of far-right hardliners in his coalition who have threatened to bring down the government in previous rounds.

The Iran-Israel war, in which the US controversially carried out strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, also revived Trump’s interest in the Middle East. Trump entered office just as the phased Gaza ceasefire deal was being agreed. But Trump put little diplomatic pressure on Israel to engage in serious talks to get from the first phase of the agreement to phase two, allowing the war to resume in March.

Now however, after assisting Israel militarily in Iran, Trump has significant leverage he can use with Netanyahu. He will have the chance to use it (if he chooses) when Netanyahu visits Washington next week.

Both men also view Iran’s weakened position as an opportunity for expanding the Abraham accords. This was the set of agreements normalising relations between Israel and several Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco, which Trump brokered at the end of his first term.

Netanyahu has long eyed a US-backed deal with Saudi Arabia, and a smaller-scale declaration with Syria is reportedly now under discussion as well. But those deals can’t move forward while the war in Gaza is going.

Additional obstacles

However, the recurrent obstacles to a deal remain – and it’s unclear if the proposed terms will include guarantees to prevent Israel resuming the war after the 60-day period.

New issues have also arisen since the last round of talks that could create further challenges. Hamas is demanding a return to traditional humanitarian aid distribution in Gaza – or at least the replacement of the controversial US and Israeli-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF).

The GHF’s four distribution sites, located in militarised zones, replaced over 400 previously operating aid points, and more than 400 people have been killed while seeking aid near the sites, since May 26. More than 170 international non-governmental organisations and charities have called for the GHF to be shut down.

Israel’s military control over Gaza has also become further entrenched since the last ceasefire. More than 80% is thought to be covered by evacuation orders – and new orders for north Gaza and Gaza City were issued on June 29 and July 2 respectively.

Israeli officials have described the renewed operations as military pressure on Hamas to accept a ceasefire. But Netanyahu has also spoken openly about long-term military occupation of Gaza.

He recently stated that Israel would remain in “full security control of Gaza” even after the war. Even if a temporary ceasefire is agreed, the road ahead is strewn with difficulties in moving towards a long-lasting ceasefire or reaching an acceptable “day-after” agreement.

Still, the current moment offers an opportunity for a breakthrough. Trump has a renewed interest in getting to a ceasefire and Netanyahu has a rare political window to enter an agreement and get hostages home. Hamas, meanwhile, has been weakened, not only by Israel’s relentless military pounding, but by increasing disillusionment from the people of Gaza, who are desperate for an end to the war.

There is no shortage of reasons to end the war in Gaza. The only question is if Israel and Hamas have the will to do so.

Julie M. Norman, Senior Associate Fellow on the Middle East at RUSI; Associate Professor in Politics & International Relations, UCL

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Ticker Views

How many serious incidents are happening in Australian childcare centres? We don’t really know

Published

on

How many serious incidents are happening in Australian childcare centres? We don’t really know

Catherine Delahaye/ Getty Images

Erin Harper, University of Sydney

This week, a Melbourne childcare worker was charged over alleged sexual abuse of young children in his care. Families are justifiably appalled and furious – with 1,200 children urged to be tested for a sexually transmitted infection.

This is the latest in a string of serious safety concerns this year alone, exposing systemic issues in our early childhood sector.

Recent investigations have exposed reports of neglect, with inadequate food, unhygienic nappy changes, and physical and sexual abuse at daycare services.

Unfortunately, there are too many incidents to be seen as “one-offs”.

But how widespread are unsafe or abusive practices in Australian childcare centres? The short answer is, we don’t actually know.

The number of ‘serious incidents’ in childcare

The national childcare quality authority reports on the number of “serious incidents” in childcare services.

This includes the death of a child, and serious injury, illness, or trauma requiring urgent medical attention. It also includes a child going missing or unknowingly being locked in or out of the service. But it doesn’t technically include child abuse. Unless, for example, the abuse resulted in a situation where the child required urgent medical attention.

The national childcare quality authority’s data shows there has been a slow but steady increase in the rate of serious incidents in the eight years to 2023–24.

For example, the rate of reported serious incidents in 2023–24 was 148 per 100 approved services. This is higher than the 139 reported in 2022–23, and 124 in 2021–22.

Higher-quality services have been found to have higher rates of reporting for serious incidents. This may be because they have clearer processes, more experienced or qualified educators, or higher ratios of educators to children. We also know larger services tend to report more serious incidents than smaller ones.

For-profit services have been found to have higher breach rates than not-for-profits. A breach is any instance where a regulation or law was not followed.

What about under-reporting?

Some incidents may not even be reported in the first place. Under-reporting could occur unintentionally. For example, the service is unaware of an incident, or educators do not recognise what constitutes a reportable incident, or they are not sure how to report the different kinds of reportable incidents.

But unfortunately, under-reporting may happen intentionally. When a service reports an incident to their state or territory regulatory authority, they may be subject to an investigation and/or heightened scrutiny in future. This could be a deterrent for some services to report incidents.

What about child abuse?

At the moment, if physical or sexual abuse of a child is suspected at a service, incidents and allegations should be reported through a national online portal within seven days.

The federal government has just announced from September 1 this year, the window will come down to 24 hours.

The portal is provided by the national childcare quality authority, but it can be accessed by state and territory regulatory authorities.

But childcare services are also subject to state and territory child protection legislation. The definitions and reporting requirements for different child abuse situations vary across states and territories.

This makes the data messy and difficult to track.

There are other reporting requirements

Services also need to lodge other kinds of notifications relating to children’s health and safety. Examples might include incidents of broken glass in a centre, a severe infection outbreak, a damaged fence, or the presence of someone who was not authorised to be there.

Again, some of these incidents go through a national online portal, whereas others might go to state or territory child protection authorities, departments of education, or departments of health.

As the national quality authority noted in its 2023 report into childcare safety, this means different organisations are collecting information and may not always use the same terminology or reporting timeframes. They don’t necessarily share the information they have.

This lack of coordination also means we do not have consistent national data collection on child abuse and other aspects of child welfare in daycare centres.

What now?

We need a national, consistent approach to collecting and sharing data about safety in all childcare services. This would require a committed collaboration between state and federal agencies.

At the moment, crucial information about what is happening in services is not shared between jurisdictions. Just as we do not have good information about high-risk potential employees (in part, due to issues with the working with children checks system).

But on top of fixing how data is collected and shared, we also need to look at how it is reported in the first place.

All early childhood educators should have child protection training, to increase understanding across the sector. We also need simpler and nationally consistent procedures for services, so it is easier for educators to recognise and report child safety incidents.


If this article has raised issues for you, or if you’re concerned about someone you know, you can call 1800 Respect on 1800 737 732, Lifeline on 131 114, Kids Helpline on 1800 55 1800, or Bravehearts (counselling and support for survivors of child sexual abuse) on 1800 272 831.

Erin Harper, Lecturer, School of Education and Social Work, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Trending Now