Asher Kaufman, University of Notre Dame

President Donald Trump will sit down with the Saudi crown prince and Emirati and Qatari leaders on May 14, 2025, in what is being heavily touted as a high-stakes summit. Not invited, and watching warily, will be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Like many other members of his right-wing coalition, Netanyahu appeared delighted at the election of Trump as U.S. president in November, believing that the Republican’s Middle East policies would undoubtedly favor Israeli interests and be coordinated closely with Netanyahu himself.

But it hasn’t quite played out that way. Of course, Washington remains – certainly in official communications – Israel’s strongest global ally and chief supplier of arms. But Trump is promoting a Middle East policy that is, at times, distinctly at odds with the interests of Netanyahu and his government.

In fact, in pushing for an Iran nuclear deal – a surprise reversal from Trump’s first administration – Trump is undermining long-held Netanyahu positions. Such is the level of alarm in Israeli right-wing circles that rumors have been circulating of Trump announcing unilateral U.S. support for a Palestinian state ahead of the Riyadh visit – something that would represent a clear departure for Washington.

As a historian of Israel and the broader Middle East, I recognize that in key ways Trump’s agenda in Riyadh represents a continuation of the U.S. policies, notably in pursuing security relationships with Arab Gulf monarchies – something Israel has long accepted if not openly supported. But in the process, the trip could also put significant daylight between Trump and Netanyahu.

Trump’s official agenda

The four-day trip to the Gulf, Trump’s first policy-driven foreign visit since being elected president, is on the surface more about developing economic and security ties between the U.S. and traditional allies in the Persian Gulf.

Trump is expected to cement trade deals worth tens of billions of dollars between the U.S. and Arab Gulf States, including unprecedented arms purchases, Gulf investments in the U.S. and even the floated Qatari gift of a palatial 747 intended for use as Air Force One.

There is also the possibility of a security alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

So far, so good for Israel’s government. Prior to the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel was already in the process of forging closer ties to the Gulf states, with deals and diplomatic relations established with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain through the Abraham Accords that the Trump administration itself facilitated in September 2020. A potential normalization of ties with Saudi Arabia was also in the offing.

Dealing with Tehran

But central to the agenda this week in Riyadh will be issues where Trump and Netanyahu are increasingly not on the same page. And that starts with Iran.

While the country won’t be represented, Iran will feature heavily at Trump’s summit, as it coincides with the U.S. administration’s ongoing diplomatic talks with Tehran over its nuclear program. Those negotiations have now concluded four rounds. And despite clear challenges, American and Iranian delegations continue to project optimism about the possibility of reaching a deal.

The approach marks a change of course for Trump, who in 2018 abandoned a similar deal to the one he is now largely looking to forge. It also suggests the U.S. is currently opposed to the idea of direct armed confrontation with Iran, against Netanayhu’s clear preference.

Diplomacy with Tehran is also favored by Gulf states as a way of containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Even Saudi Arabia – Tehran’s long-term regional rival that, like Israel, opposed the Obama-era Iran nuclear diplomacy – is increasingly looking for a more cautious engagement with Iran. In April, the Saudi defense minister visited Tehran ahead of the recent U.S.-Iranian negotiations.

Netanyahu has built his political career on the looming threat from a nuclearized Iran and the necessity to nip this threat in the bud. He unsuccessfully tried to undermine President Barack Obama’s initial efforts to reach an agreement with Iran – resulting in 2015’s Iran nuclear deal. But Netanyahu had more luck with Obama’s successor, helping convince Trump to withdraw from the agreement in 2018.

So Trump’s about-turn on Iran talks has irked Netanyahu – not only because it happened, but because it happened so publicly. In April, the U.S. president called Netanyahu to the White House and openly embarrassed him by stating that Washington is pursuing diplomatic negotiations with Tehran.

Split over Yemen

A clear indication of the potential tension between the Trump administration and the Israeli government can be seen in the ongoing skirmishes involving the U.S., Israel and the Houthis in Yemen.

After the Houthis fired a missile at the Tel Aviv airport on May 4 – leading to its closure and the cancellation of multiple international flights – Israel struck back, devastating an airport and other facilities in Yemen’s capital.

But just a few hours after the Israeli attack, Trump announced that the U.S. would not strike the Houthis anymore, as they had “surrendered” to his demands and agreed not to block passage of U.S. ships in the Red Sea.

It became clear that Israel was not involved in this new understanding between the U.S. and the Houthis. Trump’s statement was also notable in its timing, and could be taken as an effort to calm the region in preparation of his trip to Saudi Arabia. The fact that it might help smooth talks with Iran too – Tehran being the Houthis’ main sponsor – was likely a factor as well.

Timing is also relevant in Israel’s latest attack on Yemeni ports. They took place on May 11 – the eve of Trump setting off for his visit to Saudi Arabia. In so doing, Netanyahu may be sending a signal not only to the Houthis but also to the U.S. and Iran. Continuing to attack the Houthis might make nuclear talks more difficult.

Bibi’s political survival-first approach

Critical observers of Netanyahu have long argued that he prioritizes continued war in Gaza over regional calm for the sake of holding together his far-right coalition, members of which desire full control of the Gaza Strip and de-facto annexation of the West Bank.

This, many political commentators have argued, is the main reason why Netanyahu backed off from the last stage of the ceasefire agreement with Hamas in March – something which would have required the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Gaza Strip.

Since the collapse of the ceasefire, Israel’s army has mobilized in preparation for a renewed Gaza assault, scheduled to start after the end of Trump’s trip to the Gulf.

With members of the Netanayhu government openly supporting the permanent occupation of the strip and declaring that bringing back the remaining Israeli hostages is no longer a top priority, it seems clear to me that deescalation is not on Netanyahu’s agenda.

Trump himself has noted recently both the alarming state of the hostages and the grave humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Now, in addition to the release of Israeli-American hostage Edan Alexander, the U.S. is also engaged in negotiations with Hamas over ceasefire and aid – ignoring Netanyahu in the process.

The bottom dollar

Current U.S. policy in the region may all be serving a greater aim for Trump: to secure billions of dollars of Gulf money for the American economy and, some have said, himself. But to achieve that requires a stable Middle East, and continued war in Gaza and Iran inching closer to nuclear capabilities might disrupt that goal.

Of course, a diplomatic agreement over Tehran’s nuclear plans is still some way off. And Trump’s foreign policy is notably prone to abrupt turns. But whether guided by a dealmaker’s instincts to pursue trade and economic deals with wealthy Gulf states, or by a genuine – and related – desire to stabilize the region, his administration is increasingly pursuing policies that go against the interests of the current Israeli government.

Asher Kaufman, Professor of History and Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Michelle Grattan, University of Canberra

Labor’s extraordinary election result has triggered a power play that has exposed the uglier entrails of Labor factionalism.

Even before the new caucus met in Canberra on Friday, the Labor right had dumped two of its cabinet ministers: Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus and Industry Minister Ed Husic. Dreyfus is from the Victorian right, Husic from the New South Wales right.

In Labor, factionalism can trump merit. Not always, of course, but undoubtedly more often than is desirable, and certainly in this case.

These dramatic demotions to the backbench have been driven by two factors.

The left has more numbers in the caucus after the election, meaning that to preserve factional balances, one minister from the right had to go.

And then Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles used his heft as chief of the Victorian right to protect the numbers of that group in the ministry, at the expense of the NSW right, and to secure a key promotion.

In sacrificing Dreyfus who, while from the right, isn’t a serious factional player, Marles has seen the elevation into the outer ministry of his numbers man Sam Rae (as well as another Victorian right-winger, Daniel Mulino).

Rae, little known publicly, has only been in parliament since 2022. He’s a former Victorian Labor state secretary and was a partner at PwC. Mulino, with a substantial background in economic policy, has served in both the Victorian and federal parliaments.

Some see the Marles move as, in part, looking to shore up his numbers for any future leadership race. While this might sound far-fetched, given Anthony Albanese’s huge win and declaration he’ll serve a full term, aspirants always have an eye on the future. The manoeuvre won’t be missed by another leadership aspirant, Treasurer Jim Chalmers, a Queenslander who is also from the right.

Given his enhanced authority, Albanese could have intervened to protect the two ministers – there was an attempt from within the NSW right to get him to do so for Husic – but has chosen to let the factional power play take its course. He said on Thursday, “we have a process and we’ll work it through”, adding that “no individual is greater than the collective, and that includes myself”.

In the fallout, with the loss of Dreyfus there will be no Jewish minister, which is unfortunate in light of the government’s strained relations with the Jewish community. Husic’s demotion takes the only Muslim out of cabinet, although the speculation is another Muslim, Anne Aly, will be elevated to cabinet.

Former prime minister Paul Keating was scathing of the demotions, denouncing the “appalling denial of Husic’s diligence and application in bringing the core and emerging technologies of the digital age to the centre of Australian public policy”.

Keating said Albanese’s non-intervention in relation to Husic “is, in effect, an endorsement of a representative of another state group – in this case, the Victorian right faction led by Richard Marles – a faction demonstrably devoid of creativity and capacity”.

Keating described the treatment of the two ministers as “a showing of poor judgement, unfairness and diminished respect for the contribution of others”.

It will take a while to see what ripples the factional power play brings. Husic, certainly, is feisty. He could become a strong voice on a Labor backbench that has been basically quiescent. He is already booked to appear on the ABC’s Insiders program on Sunday and its Q&A panel on Monday.

Now that the factions have had their say, the prime minister allocates jobs, with particular interest on what Environment Minister Tanya Plibersek receives.

On the other side of politics, it is not surprising there is widespread anger, ill feeling and recriminations, given the magnitude of the Liberals’ defeat. The contest for leadership between the party’s Deputy Leader Sussan Ley and Shadow Treasurer Angus Taylor had already become willing before the bombshell defection of Senator Jacinta Price from the Nationals to the Liberals increased the angst exponentially.

The Nationals feel betrayed that their star performer has walked out on them. Her defection will complicate negotiations between the Liberals and the Nationals over their inter-party agreement.

The move, part of the attempt by Taylor, from the right, to boost his support, is further dividing the Liberal party. It is not yet clear whether Price will join a ticket with Taylor to run for deputy. In interviews on Thursday night and Friday morning she kept her options open, presumably to determine what numbers she would draw.

While having the Liberal deputy in the Senate would be inconvenient, it has precedent. Fred Chaney, then a senator, became deputy in Andrew Peacock’s coup against John Howard in 1989. It didn’t end well.

If Price did run, that might help Taylor with some Liberals currently uncertain of which leadership contender to support, because they would know she would be popular in their branches.

But for the moderates in the party, who want the Liberals to find a path back in traditional urban areas, the arrival of Price, with her hardline right views, sends all the wrong signals. The leafy city suburbs are populated with small-l voters and professional women, who would not see themselves in tune with Price’s views.

It there was a Taylor-Price leadership team that would be an unmistakable message – that the Liberals were tracking very significantly away from the mainstream in which most voters swim.

Price was the leading figure who helped sink the Voice referendum, but she has not yet proved herself on the broader range of issues. In the campaign, her reference to “make Australia great again” was used against the Coalition to claim it was “Trumpian”.

Explaining her move, Price says that she had actually always wanted to sit in the Liberal party room. She comes from the Northern Territory Country Liberal party, whose representatives sit with either the Liberals or the Nationals, according to a formula.

On her timing, Price said, “right now, amongst many of the conversations I have had with those leading up to making this decision, is that extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures”.

Within the Liberals, Price, given her profile and her status as a poster-woman of the rightwing media, will potentially be hard to handle.

While Labor savours the taste of triumph, and the Coalition drinks the the bitter brew of defeat, a week on Dreyfus, Husic and the Nationals discover the limits of loyalty.

Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.