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US-Russia nuclear arms control treaty comes to an end

Published

4 hours ago

February 3, 2026

The Conversation

The only remaining US-Russia nuclear treaty expires this week. Could a new arms race soon accelerate?

Tilman Ruff, The University of Melbourne

The New START treaty, the last remaining agreement constraining Russian and US nuclear weapons, is due to lapse on February 4.

There are no negotiations to extend the terms of the treaty, either. As US President Donald Trump said dismissively in a recent interview, “if it expires, it expires”.

The importance of the New START treaty is hard to overstate. As other nuclear treaties have been abrogated in recent years, this was the only deal left with notification, inspection, verification and treaty compliance mechanisms between Russia and the US. Between them, they possess 87% of the world’s nuclear weapons.

The demise of the treaty will bring a definitive and alarming end to nuclear restraint between the two powers. It may very well accelerate the global nuclear arms race, too.

What is New START?

The New START or Prague Treaty was signed by then-US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart, Dimitri Medvedev, in Prague on April 8, 2010. It entered into force the following year.

It superseded a 2002 treaty that obligated Russia and the United States to reduce their operationally deployed, strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012.

The New START Treaty called for further reductions on long-range nuclear weapons and provided greater specificity about different types of launchers. The new limits were:

700 deployed intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (together with heavy bombers)
1,550 nuclear warheads deployed on those platforms, and
800 launchers (both deployed and non-deployed).

These reductions were achieved by February 5, 2018.

The treaty included mechanisms for compliance and verification, which have worked effectively. It provided for twice-yearly exchanges of data and ongoing mutual notification about the movement of strategic nuclear forces, which in practice occurred on a nearly daily basis.

Importantly, the treaty also mandated short-notice, on-site inspections of missiles, warheads and launchers covered by the treaty, providing valuable and stabilising insights into the other’s nuclear deployments.

Lastly, the treaty established a bilateral consultative commission and clear procedures to resolve questions or disputes.

Limitations of the deal

The treaty was criticised at the time for its modest reductions and the limited types of nuclear weapons it covered.

But the most enduring downside was the political price Obama paid to achieve ratification by the US Senate.

To secure sufficient Republican support, he agreed to a long-term program of renewal and modernisation of the entire US nuclear arsenal – in addition to the facilities and programs that produce and maintain nuclear weapons. The overall pricetag was estimated to reach well over US$2 trillion.

This has arguably done more harm by entrenching the United States’ possession of nuclear weapons and thwarting prospects for disarmament.

As the New START treaty was about to expire in 2021, Russia offered to extend it for another five years, as allowed under the terms. US President Donald Trump, however, refused to reciprocate.

After winning the 2020 US presidential election, Joe Biden did agree to extend the treaty on February 3, 2021, just two days before it would have expired. The treaty does not provide for any further extensions.

In February 2023, Russia suspended its implementation of key aspects of the treaty, including stockpile data exchange and on-site inspections. It did not formally withdraw, however, and committed to continue to abide by the treaty’s numerical limits on warheads, missiles and launchers.

What could happen next

With the imminent expiry of the treaty this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in September 2025 that he was prepared to continue observing the numerical limits for one more year if the US acted similarly.

Besides an off-the-cuff comment by Trump – “it sounds like a good idea to me” – the US did not formally respond to the Russian offer.

Trump has further complicated matters by insisting that negotiations on any future nuclear arms control agreements include China. However, China has consistently refused this. There is also no precedent for such trilateral nuclear control or disarmament negotiations, which would no doubt be long and complex. Though growing, China’s arsenal is still less than 12% the size of the US arsenal and less than 11% the size of Russia’s.

The New START treaty now looks set to expire without any agreement to continue to observe its limits until a successor treaty is negotiated.

This means Russia and the US could increase their deployed warheads by 60% and 110%, respectively, within a matter of months. This is because both have the capacity to load a larger number of warheads on their missiles and bombers than they currently do. Both countries also have large numbers of warheads in reserve or slated for dismantlement, but still intact.

If they took these steps, both countries could effectively double their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals.

The end of the treaty’s verification, data exchanges, and compliance and notification processes would also lead to increased uncertainty and distrust. This, in turn, could lead to a further build-up of both countries’ already gargantuan military capabilities.

An ominous warning

The most unsettling part of this development: it means nuclear disarmament, and even more modest arms control, is now moribund.

No new negotiations for disarmament or even reducing nuclear risks are currently under way. None are scheduled to begin.

At a minimum, after New START expires this week, both Russia and the US should agree to stick to its limits until they negotiate further reductions.

And, 56 years after making a binding commitment in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve nuclear disarmament, both nations should work to implement a verifiable agreement among all nuclear-armed states to eliminate their arsenals.

But Russia, the US and and other nuclear-armed states are moving in the opposite direction.

Trump’s actions since taking office a second time – from bombing Iran to toppling Venezuela’s leader – show his general disdain for international law and treaties. They also affirm his desire to use any instrument of power to assert US (and his personal) interests and supremacy.

Putin, meanwhile, has used of a nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile to strike Ukraine, made repeated threats to use nuclear weapons against Kyiv and the West, and continued his unprecedented and profoundly dangerous weaponisation of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.

These moves signal a more aggressive Russian stance that rides roughshod over the UN Charter, as well.

All of this bodes ill for preventing nuclear war and making progress on nuclear disarmament.

Tilman Ruff, Honorary Principal Fellow, School of Population and Global Health, The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Ticker Views

Trump cuts India tariffs after Modi agrees to end Russian oil imports

Trump announces new trade deal with India, reducing tariffs to 18% in a major shift in U.S.-India relations.

Published

8 hours ago

February 3, 2026

Harvey Vargas

Trump announces new trade deal with India, reducing tariffs to 18% in a major shift in U.S.-India relations.

In a major geopolitical shift, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a new trade deal with India that slashes tariffs on Indian goods to 18%, reversing punitive levies previously as high as 50%.

The deal came following a phone call with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and marks a significant pivot in U.S.–India economic relations after months of tension. Oz Sultan from Sultan Interactive Group joins us to break down what this means for exporters and global markets.

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Ticker Views

UK Prime Minister visits Beijing after eight years to boost trade and security

UK PM visits Beijing to strengthen trade and tackle security issues; insights from Professor Tim Harcourt on Brexit’s impact.

Published

1 day ago

February 2, 2026

Harvey Vargas

UK PM visits Beijing to strengthen trade and tackle security issues; insights from Professor Tim Harcourt on Brexit’s impact.

The British Prime Minister has made the first visit to Beijing in eight years, aiming to strengthen trade links and address growing security concerns with China.

Joining us to unpack the visit is Professor Tim Harcourt, Chief Economist at UTS, who discusses how Brexit has reshaped Britain’s approach and the delicate balance between economic opportunities and security commitments to the USA and NATO.

We also explore how China’s alliances with countries like Myanmar and Russia, along with Canada’s differing approach, influence trade relations, and what this visit means for Australia’s relationship with China.

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Ticker Views

3 things to know about Kevin Warsh, Trump’s nod for Fed chair

Published

3 days ago

January 31, 2026

The Conversation

3 things to know about Kevin Warsh, Trump’s nod for Fed chair

Kevin Warsh has been tapped by Donald Trump to lead the Federal Reserve.
AP Photo/Alastair Grant

D. Brian Blank, Mississippi State University and Brandy Hadley, Appalachian State University

After months of speculation, President Donald Trump nominated Kevin Warsh on Jan. 30, 2026, to be the next chair of the Federal Reserve.

If confirmed by Congress, Warsh will inherit leadership of the U.S. central bank at a delicate time. For months, current Fed Chair Jerome Powell has come under attack from the Trump administration for failing to heed the president’s call for lower interest rates. The fight has put into question the central bank’s independence and its role in stewarding the economy.

Powell’s term as chair will end in mid-May, leaving his successor to navigate an economy that has improved on some fronts but remains uneven and uncertain.

But what should America expect from the next Fed chair? Here are three things to note about Trump’s nominee.

1. He is a familiar face …

Warsh brings deep experience with monetary policymaking to the role.

A graduate of Stanford University and Harvard Law School, he served as special assistant to the president for economic policy and executive secretary of the White House National Economic Council under President George W. Bush before becoming one of the youngest members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.

Warsh is no newcomer to discussions about Federal Reserve leadership. He was a finalist for the job in 2017, when Trump instead appointed Powell. Trump has since stated that he made a mistake by not selecting Warsh then – though clashes between Trump and Powell may have influenced that view.

Two men in suits walk outside. — Fed Chair Jerome Powell increasingly found himself out of step with Donald Trump’s wishes.
AP Photo/Pablo Martinez Monsivais

Warsh’s credentials are unquestionable. As a governor of the Federal Reserve Board from 2006 to 2011, he worked closely with other policymakers and with Wall Street during the global financial crisis of 2008. Since departing the Fed, he has returned to Stanford as a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution and a lecturer at the Graduate School of Business, as well as a member of the Panel of Economic Advisers of the Congressional Budget Office.

He also has ties to the finance industry. He began his career in mergers and acquisitions at Morgan Stanley and, since leaving the Fed, has worked as a partner at Duquesne Family Office, an investment firm that manages the personal wealth of hedge fund manager Stanley Druckenmiller and other investors.

In 2016, Trump included Warsh in an economic advisory group assembled during his transition. Critics of Warsh’s nomination point toward his father-in-law, Ronald Lauder, a college friend and donor of the president, as evidence of politicization.

2. … with evolving monetary views

The big question people have is what a Warsh Fed would mean for monetary policy – that is, is it likely to play tight or loose with rates.

When the economy is growing quickly, like in 2021, the Federal Reserve tightens policy by raising interest rates to avoid the kind of economic growth that may not be sustainable long term and can lead to bubbles. However, during downturns, like in 2008 or 2020, the economic policy that can provide a backstop for the economy is looser. The Fed tends to lower rates in these situations, which supports growth.

Warsh’s views on monetary policy have long been considered hawkish, meaning he is inclined toward tighter policy and generally higher interest rates to keep inflation in check, even at the expense of slower economic growth. During his previous tenure at the Fed, he signaled concern about expansive monetary tools such as quantitative easing, in which the central bank buys Treasurys and other securities to stimulate the economy. This resulted in what Warsh called a “bloated” Fed balance sheet that held almost US$9 trillion of debt at its peak in 2022.

In recent public remarks leading up to his nomination, however, he has increasingly aligned in part with Trump’s push for lower interest rates and discussed establishing a new Treasury-Fed Accord, like in 1951, when Fed independence from fiscal authorities such as the Treasury Department was established.

3. His nod highlights fight over Fed independence

A central question surrounding this nomination is whether it promotes the politicization of the Federal Reserve.

The Fed’s independence from day-to-day political pressure has long been viewed as a cornerstone of U.S. economic policymaking. Decisions about interest rates, inflation control and financial stability are insulated from electoral politics for that reason. A truly independent Fed can resist making decisions that provide a short-term economic bump – something incumbent governments tend to like – but may lead to longer-term economic pain down the road.

The Fed tends to use its monetary policy tools carefully. Yet politicians tend to want looser monetary policy so the economy grows fast and they get credit for it.

And Warsh’s nomination can be seen in the context of a broader push from the executive branch to exert greater influence over monetary policy. Given Trump’s public criticism of Powell and vocal calls for his early departure, the president almost certainly intended to nominate someone who would lower interest rates according to preferences stated by the administration.

Critics of the nomination have argued that Warsh has a tendency to be more opportunistic with his policy views than Powell and other economists, who try to ignore political preferences.

As such, Warsh’s nomination encapsulates more than just a leadership transition. It highlights the ongoing tensions between political priorities and the traditional economic playbook, between short-term growth pressures and long-term stability, and between institutional independence and democratic accountability.

Time will tell whether he turns out to be hawkish or politically motivated as chair, if he is confirmed.

D. Brian Blank, Associate Professor of Finance, Mississippi State University and Brandy Hadley, Associate Professor of Finance and Distinguished Scholar of Applied Investments, Appalachian State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.