Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, University of Toronto; USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

The latest rounds of nuclear talks between the U.S. and Iran are going well enough for now, according to the steady drip of public statements from the main parties involved.

“I think they want to make a deal,” said U.S. President Donald Trump on the eve of the latest round of discussions held in Geneva on Feb. 17, 2026. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, noted progress over the “guiding principles” of the talks.

Such optimism was similarly on display during initial talks in Oman earlier in the month.

But as someone who has researched nonproliferation and U.S. national security for two decades and was involved in State Department nuclear diplomacy, I know we have been here before.

Optimism also existed in spring 2025, during five rounds of indirect talks that preceded the United States bombing of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure as part of a broader Israeli attack. Pointedly, Iran noted in February that a climate of mistrust created by that attack hangs over the efforts for a negotiated deal now.

And underpinning any pessimism over a deal now is the fact that talks are taking place with a backdrop of U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf region and counteraction from Iran, including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz for a live-fire drill.

Red lines

But it is more than mistrust that will need to be overcome. The positions of both the U.S. government and Iran have ossified since May 8, 2018 – the date when the first Trump administration withdrew the United States from the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal.

Iran continues to be unwilling to even discuss its ballistic missile program. This is a red line for them.

Yet the United States continues to demand limits to Iran’s ballistic missiles and the ending of Iran’s support of proxy fighters in the region be included in the nuclear talks, in addition to having Iran fully abandon enriching uranium – including at the low civilian-use level agreed on under the 2015 nuclear deal.

The talks are taking place amid a wider trend toward the end of what can be called the “arms control era.” The expiration of New START – which until Feb. 5, 2026, limited both the size and status of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons and maintained robust verification mechanisms – together with the increasing willingness to engage in military actions to achieve political goals heightens the challenges for diplomacy.

Military brinkmanship

So why the apparent public optimism from the U.S. government?

Trump believes that Iran is in a weaker position than during his first term, following the largely successful Israeli attacks on Iran’s regional proxies as well as on Iran itself. The strategic capabilities of Tehran’s two main sponsored groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, are clearly diminished as a result of Israeli action.

The U.S. may also still feel it has the upper hand following the June 2025 Operation Rising Lion, in which Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was attacked in response to an International Atomic Energy Agency’s report that Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons grade enriched uranium surged by over 50% in the spring.

The reopening of talks now also comes in the immediate aftermath of Iran’s bloody crackdown on anti-government protests, leaving thousands of protesters dead.

The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group was deployed near Iranian waters in January as a signal to the protesters of U.S support. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said that successful talks must include topics beyond Iran’s nuclear program, including the “treatment of (its) own people.”

Trump continues to consider military options against Iran, warning that “if they don’t make a deal, the consequences are very steep.”

Yet there is a danger that Washington may be overestimating its position.

While the United States maintains that Iranian nuclear sites were “obliterated” in the June attack, satellite imagery indicates that Iran is working to restore its nuclear program. And while Tehran’s proxies in Gaza and Lebanon are severely degraded, Iranian-supported militias in Iraq, including the Kataib Hezbollah, have renewed urgent preparations for war – potentially against the U.S. – and the Houthi rebels have threatened to withdraw from a ceasefire deal with the United States.

Moreover, Iran’s commitment to its ballistic missile program is stronger than ever before, with much of the infrastructure already rebuilt from Operation Rising Lion.

No returning to the 2015 deal

Iran maintains that the talks must be confined only to guarantees about the civilian purpose of its nuclear program, not its missile program, its support of regional proxy groups or its own human rights abuses.

And that is incompatible with the U.S.’s long-held position.

This disagreement ultimately prevented the U.S. and Iran from renewing the now-defunct 2015 political deal during the Biden administration. Signed by China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K., the United States and Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) halted Iran’s development of nuclear technology and stockpiling of nuclear material in exchange for lifting multiple international economic sanctions placed on Iran. Ballistic missile technology and Iran’s proxy support for regional militias were not included in the original agreement due to Iran’s unwillingness to include those measures.

The parties to the Iran deal ultimately decided that a nuclear deal was better than the alternative of no deal at all.

There was a window for such a deal to be resumed in between the two Trump administrations. And the Biden administration publicly pledged to strengthen and renew the Obama-era nuclear deal in 2021.

But by then, Iran had significantly increased its nuclear technical capability during the four years that has passed since the JCPOA collapsed.

That increased the difficulty: Just to return to the previous deal would have required Iran to give up the new technical capability it had achieved for no new benefits.

The window closed in 2022 after Iran removed all of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s surveillance and monitoring under the deal and started enriching uranium to near weapons levels and stockpiling sufficient amounts for several nuclear weapons.

The IAEA, the U.N’s nuclear watchdog, currently maintains only normal safeguards Iran had agreed to before the JCPOA.

Even with the 2025 U.S. strikes, Iran currently has the ability to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb within weeks to several months. This is up from over a year under the 2015 deal.

US and Iran talks today

Although most analysts doubt that Iran has developed the weaponization knowledge necessary to build a nuclear bomb – estimates vary from several months to about two years due to the lack of access to and evidence on Iran’s weaponization research – Iran’s technical advances reduce the value for the U.S. government of returning to the 2015 deal. Iran’s knowledge cannot be put back into Pandora’s box.

But talks do not necessarily need an end point – in the shape of a deal – for them to have purpose.

With the increased military brinkmanship, talks could help the U.S. and Iran step back from the edge, build trust and perhaps develop better political relations. Both sides would benefit from this stabilization: Iran economically, from being reintegrated into the international system, and the U.S. from a verifiable lengthening of the time it would take Iran to break out.

None of this is guaranteed.

When I worked in multilateral nuclear diplomacy for the U.S. State Department, we saw talks fail in 2009 regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, after six years of on-and-off progress. The consequence of that failure is a more unstable East Asia and renewed interest by South Korea in developing nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, the same dynamic appears here. The shape of a potential new deal is unclear. As time passes with no deal, both sides harden their negotiating starting points, making a deal less likely.

Military escalations may lead to a new willingness to compromise on the part of Iran or precipitate its decision to build nuclear weapons.

But even should the talks prove a failure, the effort to dampen the confrontational responses and heightening tensions would still be valuable in reducing the possibility of regional conflict.

Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, Professor of International Relations, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto; USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Sebastian Maslow, University of Tokyo

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and her ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) got a historic landslide victory in last week’s parliamentary elections.

This marks the first time since its founding in 1955 that the conservative LDP controls a two-thirds supermajority in the lower house. If necessary, Takaichi’s cabinet could also overrule any opposition in the upper house of the Diet (Japan’s parliament), where her coalition still lacks a majority.

Given this, Takaichi now has a massive mandate to push her agenda. This includes boosting defence spending, strengthening the military and even potentially revising Japan’s pacifist constitution, which constrains the role of the Self-Defence Forces and forbids going to war.

So, does this mean Japan could become a more militarised state under Takaichi? And if so, what are the implications for regional security?

Countering China’s rise

Takaichi has portrayed herself as Japan’s Margaret Thatcher and the standard-bearer of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s legacy.

Abe, who led the LDP back to power in 2012, had pledged to “restore a strong Japan”. During his eight-year rule, Japan adopted a so-called “proactive pacifism”. Under this new security strategy, Japan began to depart from its
postwar pacifism through a number of ways:

• strengthening the military
• lifting bans on arms exports
• building new security partnerships (including with NATO, the European Union and the Quad)
• consolidating its alliance with the United States.

In 2014, a new interpretation of the constitution also permitted Japan to engage in “collective self defence”, or aid an ally under attack.

Takaichi now sees her job as continuing Abe’s work. And her direction is clear.

Shortly after becoming prime minister last year, Takaichi triggered a spat with Beijing when she suggested Japan would come to Taiwan’s defence if it was attacked by China. Beijing retaliated with economic pressure and coercive rhetoric, but Takaichi refused to back down.

Neither Takaichi nor China’s leader, Xi Jinping, are in a hurry to improve diplomatic relations.

Beijing has urged Chinese tourists not to travel to Japan and warned that Takaichi’s moves threaten regional security and the international order.

Takaichi, meanwhile, is hoping an assertive China will help her overcome domestic opposition to her security agenda. So far, the public supports her government, too. In a poll after the election, 69% approved of her cabinet’s performance.

How Takaichi wants to transform Japan’s military

Takaichi’s government will soon begin work on a revision of its National Security Strategy from 2022. It is likely to adopt her declared “crisis management” approach, combining security and economic objectives with industrial policy.

Despite mounting public debt, Takaichi has already increased defence spending to 2% of Japan’s GDP ahead of schedule, and has pledged to spend more.

Her government is also considering acquiring nuclear submarines and has announced plans to further deregulate arms exports, ultimately allowing the transfer of lethal weapons.

Japan has already permitted the export of Patriot PAC-3 air defence missile systems to the United States to replenish stocks sent to Ukraine and Israel. Japan has also agreed to sell Mogami-class frigates to Australia and has signed deals with Italy and the United Kingdom to co-develop a next-generation fighter jet.

In addition, Japan is participating in a NATO-led initiative to supply Ukraine with military equipment. While Japan’s involvement is limited to non-lethal arms, this could lead to more defence cooperation with NATO overall.

On the domestic intelligence front, Takaichi has pledged to pass a new anti-spy law, establish a National Intelligence Bureau modelled on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and issue a national intelligence strategy.

These initiatives are intended to bolster the country’s intelligence capabilities, which have often been hindered by bureaucratic infighting. The long-term aim is eventually joining the “Five Eyes” network.

Stronger ties with the Trump administration

Faced with threats from China, North Korea and Russia, Japan has little choice but to maintain its security alliance with the US.

At the top of Takaichi’s agenda, therefore, is managing the US–Japan alliance in the era of the so-called “Donroe doctrine”. This is Trump’s new security strategy that shifts the focus of US security towards the Western hemisphere, potentially distracting from the Indo-Pacific.

Trump endorsed Takaichi during her election campaign. And when she goes to Washington on March 19, she will likely attempt to influence the White House’s China agenda before Trump visits Beijing in April.

In order to offset the potential impact of a trade deal between the US and China, Takaichi could also use her new political capital to accelerate the implementation of Japan’s own US$550 billion (A$777 billion) investment pledge in the US.

Big challenges ahead

Ten years ago, Angela Merkel, then-chancellor of Germany, was hailed as the “new leader of the free world”. Now, Takaichi is being celebrated as the “world’s most powerful woman”.

How she uses her new-found power to manoeuvre in a world of great-power rivalry and uncertain alliances will define her legacy and shape the region for years to come.

Sebastian Maslow, Associate Professor, International Relations, Contemporary Japanese Politics & Society, University of Tokyo

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.