Francesca Jackson, Lancaster University

Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor has been arrested on suspicion of misconduct in public office. The arrest comes after the US government released files that appeared to indicate he had shared official information with financier and convicted child sex offender Jeffrey Epstein while serving as a trade envoy for the UK. But the police have not given details of exactly what they are investigating.

It is important to be clear that the arrest is not related to accusations of sexual assault or misconduct. In 2022, Mountbatten-Windsor reached a settlement with the late Virginia Giuffre for an undisclosed sum that did not include an admission of liability.

Being named in the Epstein files is not an indication of misconduct. Mountbatten-Windsor has previously denied any wrongdoing in his association with Epstein and and has previously rejected any suggestion he used his time as trade envoy to further his own interests.

What was Mountbatten-Windsor’s official role and why did he lose it?

In 2001, Tony Blair’s government made the then-prince the UK’s special representative for trade and investment. According to the government at the time, his remit was to “promote UK business internationally, market the UK to potential inward investors, and build relationships in support of UK business interests”. He did not receive a salary, but he did go on hundreds of trips to promote British businesses.

Members of the royal family are often deployed by the government on international missions to promote trade. When negotiating with other countries, particularly those which are also monarchies, sending a prominent figure like a royal may help seal the deal. Indeed, the then-government claimed that the former Duke of York’s “unique position gives him unrivalled access to members of royal families, heads of state, government ministers and chief executives of companies”.

It is not unusual for members of the royal family to be deployed by the government for diplomatic missions. Royals often host incoming state visits and lead similar visits abroad, and can be deployed to lead delegations on more specific missions.

However, Mountbatten-Windsor had an official role as trade envoy. He stepped down from this role in 2011 following reports about his friendship with Epstein, who was convicted of sex offences in 2011.

Are royals protected from prosecution?

The monarch is protected by sovereign immunity, a wide-ranging constitutional principle exempting him from all criminal and civil liability. According to the leading 19th century constitutionalist Alfred Dicey, the monarch could not even be prosecuted for “shooting the Prime Minister through the head”. The Prince of Wales also enjoys immunity as Duke of Cornwall, which protects him from punishment for breaking a range of laws.

The State Immunity Act 1978, which confers immunity on the head of state, also extends to “members of the family forming part of the household”. However, this phrase has been interpreted narrowly to apply to a very tight circle of people and does not appear to apply to the monarch’s children in general. For example, in 2002 Princess Anne was prosecuted (though not arrested) for failing to control her dogs in Windsor Great Park after they bit two children.

Nevertheless, there has often been a perception that members of the royal family are held to a different standard when it comes to the law. In 2016 Thames Valley Police were criticised by anti-monarchy groups for not prosecuting the then-prince after newspaper reports alleged he had driven his car through the gates of Windsor Great Park. In 2019 the Crown Prosecution Service declined to prosecute Prince Philip for causing a car crash which injured two people.

The monarch also cannot be compelled to give evidence in court. For example, prosecutors were unable to summon the late queen to give evidence in the trial of Princess Diana’s former butler, who was accused of stealing her jewellery.

In response to Mountbatten-Windsor’s arrest, the king said: “What now follows is the full, fair and proper process by which this issue is investigated in the appropriate manner and by the appropriate authorities. In this, as I have said before, they have our full and wholehearted support and co-operation. Let me state clearly: the law must take its course.”

When was the last time a royal was arrested?

You have to go back quite a long way to find the last time that a member of the British royal family was arrested. This was during the English civil war, when Charles I was taken prisoner for treason before being found guilty and ultimately executed in 1649.

A number of royals, including Princess Anne, have committed driving-related offences, including speeding. But this arrest makes Mountbatten-Windsor the first member of the royal family to be arrested in modern times, though it should be noted that he is no longer a royal – he was stripped of all his official titles in October 2025 as his friendship with Epstein came under even more scrutiny.

What limits do police have on investigating royal estates?

Sovereign immunity also prevents police from entering private royal estates to investigate alleged crimes without permission. This can, theoretically, protect members of the royal family from arrest and prosecution. The Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 also bans police from searching royal estates for stolen or looted artefacts.

In 2007, two hen harriers were illegally shot at Sandringham estate. However, Norfolk Police first needed to ask Sandringham officials for permission to enter the estate, by which time the dead birds’ bodies had been removed. Police questioned Prince Harry, but did not bring charges.

Other incidents have allegedly led to Sandringham being accused of becoming a wildlife crime hotspot, with at least 18 reported cases of suspected wildlife offences taking place between 2003-23 – yet only one resulting in prosecution.

Another longstanding legal precedent is that no one may be arrested in the presence of the monarch or within the precincts of a royal palace. It was thought that this rule could protect other members of the royal family and royal employees. However, Mountbatten-Windsor’s arrest at Sandringham suggests that this antiquated principle may no longer hold true today.

Francesca Jackson, PhD candidate, Lancaster Law School, Lancaster University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, University of Toronto; USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

The latest rounds of nuclear talks between the U.S. and Iran are going well enough for now, according to the steady drip of public statements from the main parties involved.

“I think they want to make a deal,” said U.S. President Donald Trump on the eve of the latest round of discussions held in Geneva on Feb. 17, 2026. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, noted progress over the “guiding principles” of the talks.

Such optimism was similarly on display during initial talks in Oman earlier in the month.

But as someone who has researched nonproliferation and U.S. national security for two decades and was involved in State Department nuclear diplomacy, I know we have been here before.

Optimism also existed in spring 2025, during five rounds of indirect talks that preceded the United States bombing of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure as part of a broader Israeli attack. Pointedly, Iran noted in February that a climate of mistrust created by that attack hangs over the efforts for a negotiated deal now.

And underpinning any pessimism over a deal now is the fact that talks are taking place with a backdrop of U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf region and counteraction from Iran, including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz for a live-fire drill.

Red lines

But it is more than mistrust that will need to be overcome. The positions of both the U.S. government and Iran have ossified since May 8, 2018 – the date when the first Trump administration withdrew the United States from the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal.

Iran continues to be unwilling to even discuss its ballistic missile program. This is a red line for them.

Yet the United States continues to demand limits to Iran’s ballistic missiles and the ending of Iran’s support of proxy fighters in the region be included in the nuclear talks, in addition to having Iran fully abandon enriching uranium – including at the low civilian-use level agreed on under the 2015 nuclear deal.

The talks are taking place amid a wider trend toward the end of what can be called the “arms control era.” The expiration of New START – which until Feb. 5, 2026, limited both the size and status of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons and maintained robust verification mechanisms – together with the increasing willingness to engage in military actions to achieve political goals heightens the challenges for diplomacy.

Military brinkmanship

So why the apparent public optimism from the U.S. government?

Trump believes that Iran is in a weaker position than during his first term, following the largely successful Israeli attacks on Iran’s regional proxies as well as on Iran itself. The strategic capabilities of Tehran’s two main sponsored groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, are clearly diminished as a result of Israeli action.

The U.S. may also still feel it has the upper hand following the June 2025 Operation Rising Lion, in which Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was attacked in response to an International Atomic Energy Agency’s report that Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons grade enriched uranium surged by over 50% in the spring.

The reopening of talks now also comes in the immediate aftermath of Iran’s bloody crackdown on anti-government protests, leaving thousands of protesters dead.

The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group was deployed near Iranian waters in January as a signal to the protesters of U.S support. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said that successful talks must include topics beyond Iran’s nuclear program, including the “treatment of (its) own people.”

Trump continues to consider military options against Iran, warning that “if they don’t make a deal, the consequences are very steep.”

Yet there is a danger that Washington may be overestimating its position.

While the United States maintains that Iranian nuclear sites were “obliterated” in the June attack, satellite imagery indicates that Iran is working to restore its nuclear program. And while Tehran’s proxies in Gaza and Lebanon are severely degraded, Iranian-supported militias in Iraq, including the Kataib Hezbollah, have renewed urgent preparations for war – potentially against the U.S. – and the Houthi rebels have threatened to withdraw from a ceasefire deal with the United States.

Moreover, Iran’s commitment to its ballistic missile program is stronger than ever before, with much of the infrastructure already rebuilt from Operation Rising Lion.

No returning to the 2015 deal

Iran maintains that the talks must be confined only to guarantees about the civilian purpose of its nuclear program, not its missile program, its support of regional proxy groups or its own human rights abuses.

And that is incompatible with the U.S.’s long-held position.

This disagreement ultimately prevented the U.S. and Iran from renewing the now-defunct 2015 political deal during the Biden administration. Signed by China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K., the United States and Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) halted Iran’s development of nuclear technology and stockpiling of nuclear material in exchange for lifting multiple international economic sanctions placed on Iran. Ballistic missile technology and Iran’s proxy support for regional militias were not included in the original agreement due to Iran’s unwillingness to include those measures.

The parties to the Iran deal ultimately decided that a nuclear deal was better than the alternative of no deal at all.

There was a window for such a deal to be resumed in between the two Trump administrations. And the Biden administration publicly pledged to strengthen and renew the Obama-era nuclear deal in 2021.

But by then, Iran had significantly increased its nuclear technical capability during the four years that has passed since the JCPOA collapsed.

That increased the difficulty: Just to return to the previous deal would have required Iran to give up the new technical capability it had achieved for no new benefits.

The window closed in 2022 after Iran removed all of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s surveillance and monitoring under the deal and started enriching uranium to near weapons levels and stockpiling sufficient amounts for several nuclear weapons.

The IAEA, the U.N’s nuclear watchdog, currently maintains only normal safeguards Iran had agreed to before the JCPOA.

Even with the 2025 U.S. strikes, Iran currently has the ability to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb within weeks to several months. This is up from over a year under the 2015 deal.

US and Iran talks today

Although most analysts doubt that Iran has developed the weaponization knowledge necessary to build a nuclear bomb – estimates vary from several months to about two years due to the lack of access to and evidence on Iran’s weaponization research – Iran’s technical advances reduce the value for the U.S. government of returning to the 2015 deal. Iran’s knowledge cannot be put back into Pandora’s box.

But talks do not necessarily need an end point – in the shape of a deal – for them to have purpose.

With the increased military brinkmanship, talks could help the U.S. and Iran step back from the edge, build trust and perhaps develop better political relations. Both sides would benefit from this stabilization: Iran economically, from being reintegrated into the international system, and the U.S. from a verifiable lengthening of the time it would take Iran to break out.

None of this is guaranteed.

When I worked in multilateral nuclear diplomacy for the U.S. State Department, we saw talks fail in 2009 regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, after six years of on-and-off progress. The consequence of that failure is a more unstable East Asia and renewed interest by South Korea in developing nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, the same dynamic appears here. The shape of a potential new deal is unclear. As time passes with no deal, both sides harden their negotiating starting points, making a deal less likely.

Military escalations may lead to a new willingness to compromise on the part of Iran or precipitate its decision to build nuclear weapons.

But even should the talks prove a failure, the effort to dampen the confrontational responses and heightening tensions would still be valuable in reducing the possibility of regional conflict.

Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, Professor of International Relations, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto; USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.